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Blogs

From Presumption to Proof: Understanding Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 306.1

February 25, 20263 minute read

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For more than thirty years, the Housley presumption shaped personal injury litigation in Louisiana. Since Housley v. Cerise (1991), plaintiffs who were “in good health” before an accident and developed symptoms shortly after could rely on a presumption that the accident caused the injury. That evidentiary shortcut is now gone.

As of May 28, 2025, the Legislature has replaced the presumption with a new codified rule of evidence.

The New Reality: Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 306.1

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 306.1 now governs causation presumptions in personal injury cases. It provides:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a claim for personal injury damages that is not raised pursuant to the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law, the lack of a prior history of an illness, injury, or condition shall not create a presumption that an illness, injury, or condition was caused by the act that is the subject of the claim.”

This language expressly abolishes the Housley presumption. A plaintiff’s lack of prior complaints and the timing of symptoms no longer create any presumption of causation.

Three Strategic Takeaways for 2026

1. The Burden Is Squarely Back on the Plaintiff

With Article 306.1 now in effect, plaintiffs must affirmatively prove medical causation without the benefit of any presumption. Temporal proximity alone is no longer enough to carry the burden or defeat summary judgment. Medical testimony and documented clinical linkage will be required from the outset.

2. A Transitional, Not Truly Bifurcated, Landscape

Article 306.1 became effective on May 28, 2025, and—because it is a substantive change—it applies prospectively. Practically, this means:

  • Claims arising before May 28, 2025 may still invoke Housley.
  • Claims arising after May 28, 2025 are governed by Article 306.1.

In cases involving multiple accidents, progressive symptoms, or a course of treatment that crosses the effective date, courts will have to determine whether the injury is divisible or whether Article 306.1 governs the entire claim. Until those decisions develop, the presumption is effectively confined to older, pre‑May 28, 2025 injuries.

Importantly, Article 306.1 does not apply to workers’ compensation claims, which retain their traditional causation standards.

3. The “Double Whammy” of Louisiana’s Medical Expense Reform

The end of Housley coincides with another major reform: a new statutory framework governing recoverable medical expenses, effective January 1, 2026. Under this reform, plaintiffs generally may recover only the amounts actually paid for medical treatment, subject to limited statutory exceptions.

Together, these changes reshape exposure:

  • Article 306.1 eliminates the presumption that the plaintiff’s injury/illness was caused by the alleged tort, thereby requiring the plaintiff to affirmatively prove medical causation. The medical expense reforms reduce recoverable medical damages even when causation is established.

For defendants and insurers, this combination materially lowers risk. For plaintiffs, it raises both the evidentiary and economic hurdles.

Impact: What This Means for Litigation Strategy

These changes should influence how personal injury cases are defended, valued, and resolved:

  • Stronger Summary Judgment Opportunities: Without a causation presumption, plaintiffs must produce competent admissible medical evidence early, making causation-based summary judgment motions more viable.
  • Earlier Expert Involvement: Defense teams benefit from earlier medical reviews, IMEs, and expert input to challenge causation and shape discovery.
  • Settlement Leverage: Higher evidentiary burdens and lower recoverable medicals can push valuations downward and strengthen defense positions in negotiation.
  • Lower Case Valuations Overall: With causation harder to prove, and medical damages tied to amounts actually paid, exposure drops — especially in soft-tissue and delayed-onset injury cases.

The Practical Effects

The Housley presumption once filled gaps in medical proof and often shifted the burden toward defendants. With Article 306.1 now codified and new medical expense rules taking effect, Louisiana has entered a new era of personal injury litigation—one that demands stronger medical evidence, earlier expert involvement, and more proactive causation strategy.

The era of the “presumed injury” is over. The era of documented, defensible causation has emerged.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law…the lack of a prior history of an illness, injury, or condition shall not create a presumption that an illness, injury, or condition was caused by the act that is the subject of the claim.

www.legis.la.gov/…

Blogs

IRS Issues Interim Guidance on Special Depreciation Allowance Under the OBBBA

February 20, 20262 minute read

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On February 20, 2026, the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released Notice 2026-16, providing interim guidance on the special depreciation allowance for qualified production property enacted as part of the One, Big, Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). This statutory provision, added to Internal Revenue Code § 168(n), authorizes a temporary 100 percent “bonus” depreciation deduction for qualified production property placed in service within specified dates. Notice 2026-16 provides taxpayers with interim administrative rules ahead of formal proposed and final regulations addressing this new regime.

The Notice clarifies definitional and operational elements of the special depreciation allowance that are essential for compliance. It explains what constitutes qualified production property (generally nonresidential real property used as an integral part of a qualified production activity, such as manufacturing or refining, that results in a substantial transformation of property). The Notice also identifies the timeframes within which the property must be placed in service to qualify for the allowance, including possible extensions of time due to an “act of God.” The interim guidance further addresses the mechanics of electing into the special depreciation regime and the necessary attachment of an election statement to timely filed income tax returns.

Notice 2026-16 also provides taxpayers with practical rules on property eligibility, including de minimis tests and safe harbors for determining whether a property meets the statutory criteria. This guidance is intended to be binding on taxpayers who follow its entirety, creating a workable framework for claiming the special depreciation allowance until the IRS issues proposed regulations that will formally implement the statutory provisions. Taxpayers and practitioners are encouraged to review the interim rules carefully and to provide comments by April 20, 2026 to assist the IRS and Treasury in refining the forthcoming regulations.

Notice 2026-16 represents an important step in the IRS’s rollout of OBBBA’s broad depreciation reforms by giving taxpayers clarity and operational certainty on the application of the new § 168(n) bonus depreciation rules while formal regulatory guidance is under development. For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page. 

Blogs

AI Communications Are Not Privileged: What United States v. Heppner Means for the Defense Bar and Corporate Clients

February 19, 20264 minute read

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In a significant decision rendered this week, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York held that written exchanges between a criminal defendant and a generative AI platform were protected by neither attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine. United States v. Heppner, 25 Cr. 503 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026). 

The ruling is one of the first federal decisions squarely addressing privilege in the context of generative AI — and it carries immediate implications for defense counsel and corporate and industrial clients navigating litigation risk in an AI-saturated world. The source of the Heppner decision (the often-influential Southern District of New York) further underscores its significance.

The Core Ruling: AI Is a “Third Party” 

Judge Rakoff described the question as one “of first impression nationwide”: whether communications with a publicly available AI platform in connection with a pending criminal investigation are protected by attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine (Order at 2).

The court’s answer was direct: “the answer is no” (Order at 2). 

The defendant had used Anthropic’s Claude to generate written analyses outlining potential defense strategies after receiving a grand jury subpoena and after discussions with the government made clear he was a target (Order at 3). Claude is a “Large Language Model,” similar to ChatGPT and Google Gemini.

The defendant later shared those AI-generated documents with counsel. The government sought a ruling that the materials were not privileged.

The court began by reciting the traditional elements of attorney-client privilege: communications between client and attorney, intended to be confidential, and made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice (Order at 4). The AI documents failed on multiple grounds.

1. AI platforms are not attorneys.

The court emphasized that the AI documents were “not communications between Heppner and his counsel” and that “Claude is not an attorney” (Order at 5). Because discussions of legal issues with non-attorneys are not privileged, that fact alone was dispositive (Order at 5).

Privilege depends on a “trusting human relationship” with a licensed professional owing fiduciary duties – and no such relationship exists with an AI platform (Order at 6).

2. No reasonable expectation of confidentiality.

The court also found that the defendant lacked any reasonable expectation of confidentiality in his interactions with Claude. The court relied on Claude’s privacy policy, noting it permits collection of user inputs and outputs, use of data to train models, and disclosure to third parties, including governmental authorities (Order at 6). 

Critically, the court held that forwarding the AI outputs to counsel does not retroactively cloak them in privilege. Because the communications were not privileged “at the time they took place,” they did not become privileged merely because they were later shared with an attorney (Order at 8). 

3. Any privilege was waived.

The defendant’s final argument was that much of the information he inputted into Claude constituted information he had received from his counsel, thus making it privileged and confidential. The court disagreed, holding that even if privilege had attached to the information at one point, the defendant waived the privilege by inputting the information into Claude, “just as if he had shared it with any other third party.” (Order at 8, footnote 3). The court rejected the defendant’s proposed analogy that inputting privileged information into an AI model was the equivalent of saving or transmitting it via other cloud-based platforms (e.g., an e-mail server or a file-sharing service) – while other digital platforms may offer an expectation of privacy, Claude does not. (Order at 5-8).

4. Work product doctrine does not attach to interactions with AI platforms.

The court then turned to work product doctrine, which protects materials prepared “by or at the behest of counsel in anticipation of litigation” (Order at 9).

Even assuming the AI documents were created in anticipation of litigation, they still failed the doctrine’s core requirement – they were not prepared “by or at the behest of counsel” (Order at 9). Rather, they were prepared by the defendant “on his own volition,” and they did not reflect counsel’s strategy at the time they were created (Order at 10). The court’s ruling adheres to the general rule that the work product doctrine exists to protect lawyers’ mental processes.

The Conclusion: AI Is Subject to Traditional Privilege Rules

Judge Rakoff closed with a measured but clear statement: AI may represent a “new frontier,” but that “does not mean that its use is not subject to longstanding legal principles” governing attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine (Order at 12). Because the defendant’s use of Claude did not satisfy those principles, the materials were discoverable (Order at 12).  

Lingering Questions

The Heppner court did not address several followup questions, which will inevitably be litigated in future cases, such as:

  • Would the result have been different if the defendant had used a “closed” AI platform (i.e., one guaranteeing confidentiality) versus an “open” platform such as Claude?
  • What is the scope of the defendant’s waiver of privilege – i.e., does inputting privileged information into a third-party AI platform effect a broader subject-matter waiver, potentially exposing related communications between client and counsel on the same topic?
  • Even if discoverable, are such conversations admissible under relevance principles, particularly where the exchanges reflect exploratory brainstorming rather than concrete information?
  • Are a litigant’s conversations with an AI platform a “statement of a party” and potentially a “statement against interest” under the hearsay rules? What about the responses of the AI platform?
  • Would the result be different if a litigant interacts with an AI platform provided by counsel or at the direction of counsel? 

What This Means for Corporate Litigants and Their Counsel 

Companies increasingly use AI to analyze crisis response, draft public statements, or evaluate regulatory exposure after a catastrophe. Heppner makes clear:

  • AI-generated internal strategy documents may be discoverable.
  • Consumer-grade AI platforms create confidentiality risk.
  • If AI is used in litigation contexts, counsel should consider directing and controlling its use, and alleged contractual protections should be evaluated carefully.

For corporate actors navigating high-stakes public events — environmental incidents, product recalls, regulatory investigations — Heppner is a wake-up call: AI is not a privileged advisor.

For defense lawyers, Heppner makes clear that the universe of discoverable information is continuing to expand. Lawyers should consider advising their clients on the risk of inadvertently creating discoverable information (or waiving privilege over otherwise privileged information) by interacting with AI platforms. 

Lawyers should also consider Heppner when evaluating the cost and risk involved in defending a piece of litigation. They should consider engaging in early conversations with their clients about what AI-related paper trails exist, to avoid costly surprises once litigation reaches advanced stages.  

For further questions regarding the Heppner decision and related AI and privilege issues, contact Liskow attorney Michael Mims and visit our Environmental and Toxic Tort practice pages.

 

[E]ven if certain information that Heppner input into Claude was privileged, he waived the privilege by sharing that information with Claude and Anthropic, just as if he had shared it with any other third party.

storage.courtlistener.com/…

Blogs

LDR Streamlines PTE Election Documentation Requirements

February 18, 20262 minute read

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The Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”) has issued Revenue Information Bulletin 26-007, announcing a change to the documentation required for shareholders, partners, and members of entities that elect to pay Louisiana’s Pass-Through Entity (“PTE”) tax beginning with the 2025 taxable year. Owners of electing PTEs will no longer be required to submit a pro forma federal income tax return or nonresident worksheet with their initial Louisiana filing.

Existing regulation LAC 61:I.1001(C)(4)(d) requires each owner to submit Form R-6981, Statement of Owner’s Share of Entity Level Tax Items, together with a pro forma federal return (Form 1040 or 1041 for residents). Each nonresident owner must submit a worksheet from Louisiana Form IT-540B. Revenue Information Bulletin 26-007 provides that, starting in 2025, owners must still submit Form R-6981, but the pro forma federal return or nonresident worksheet will be required only upon request by LDR. The Department intends to amend LAC 61:I.1001 to reflect this revised requirement.

The Bulletin also reiterates that the PTE election does not change the total amount of income subject to Louisiana tax. In no event may Louisiana taxable income be greater or less than it would have been absent the election. Where the deduction reported on Form R-1968 does not accurately reflect Louisiana taxable income, taxpayers are encouraged to submit a pro forma federal return or nonresident worksheet to support the correct computation, even if not initially required.

This update reduces administrative burdens while preserving LDR’s ability to verify reported income through document requests. Taxpayers making the PTE election should adjust their filing procedures for 2025 and beyond and continue to maintain supporting documentation in anticipation of potential review by the Department. For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Bob Angelico, Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page. 

Blogs

Second Circuit Affirms Tax Liability resulting from S Corporation ownership

February 13, 20263 minute read

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On February 9, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit  upheld an individual income-tax deficiency and associated penalties against taxpayer Karen Veeraswamy for the 2014 tax year. The court’s decision reinforces the principle of consistency in taxpayer representations, the presumption of correctness of IRS deficiency notices, and the limited function of Tax Court Rule 155 computations. Veeraswamy v. Commissioner highlights the risks taxpayers face when their representations in one forum are used against them in another forum.

The underlying dispute centered on whether Ms. Veeraswamy was a 50 percent shareholder of Ashand Enterprises who realized capital gains and rental income in 2014. The Commissioner determined that Veeraswamy, was a half-owner of Ashand, and was liable for tax on her pro rata share of the corporation’s income. The taxpayer claimed she was not a stockholder of the company in 2014.

The Second Circuit’s analysis focused on the role of judicial estoppel and consistency of representations across proceedings. Although Veeraswamy argued that Ashand’s bankruptcy proceedings established that her then-husband was the sole owner, the appellate court agreed with the Tax Court that the bankruptcy confirmation order did not resolve the ownership issue on the merits and thus did not preclude the IRS’s contrary position. The court applied federal preclusion law, concluding that neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion barred the Commissioner from litigating ownership because the bankruptcy court did not enter a final decision adjudicating Veeraswamy’s ownership interest and the issue was not “actually litigated and decided” in that forum.

Moreover, the Second Circuit emphasized that the Commissioner’s tax deficiency assessment had a rational basis, which triggered the statutory presumption of correctness applicable to IRS notices of deficiency. Veeraswamy’s own statements in the bankruptcy proceedings that she was a 50 percent shareholder of Ashand provided a rational connection between the taxpayer and the corporation’s income, supporting the IRS’s determination. The court also noted that Veeraswamy failed to produce contemporaneous documentation substantiating her claimed lack of ownership or contributions to Ashand at trial, and therefore did not rebut the presumption of correctness.

The Second Circuit also upheld the Tax Court’s handling of the Rule 155 computation process. Veeraswamy attempted to use Tax Court Rule 155 to introduce additional deductions for taxes, utilities, and building expenses that she argued should reduce her tax liability, but the court found that these arguments sought to relitigate issues already decided on the merits. Rule 155 is intended solely for mechanical computation of tax liability based on established findings, not as a vehicle to raise new substantive issues or reargue matters already resolved. The appellate court therefore found no abuse of discretion in the Tax Court’s rejection of these post-opinion computations.

Finally, the Second Circuit affirmed the imposition of penalties under Internal Revenue Code § 6651(a) for failure to file and pay. Veeraswamy argued that she had reasonable cause based on accounting consultations, but the court agreed with the Tax Court that mere consultation with an accountant, without specific advice to the effect that she had no obligation to file or pay, did not establish reasonable cause. The court also rejected her arguments concerning estimated tax penalties, finding that speculative concerns about potential criminal liability did not qualify as casualty, disaster, or unusual circumstances warranting penalty relief.

The Veeraswamy decision demonstrates that inconsistent representations across legal proceedings can have significant tax consequences and that taxpayers must be attentive to how assertions made in one forum, including bankruptcy court, may affect tax liability in another forum. It also reinforces the principle that the Tax Court’s Rule 155 process is procedural and not a means to reopen or expand factual and legal determinations already made on the merits. If you have questions about this update, please contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, John Rouchell, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari and visit our Tax practice page. 

Blogs

Federal Court Upholds IRS Promoter Penalties Against Art Donation Program Operator Under IRC Section 6700

February 6, 20263 minute read

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A federal district court in Texas recently granted summary judgment in favor of the United States in a case involving penalties assessed against the operator of an art donation program that marketed charitable contribution tax deductions based on inflated appraisals and questionable ownership arrangements. The decision reinforces the Internal Revenue Service’s authority to impose substantial promoter penalties under Internal Revenue Code Section 6700 and provides important guidance on what constitutes false or fraudulent statements regarding tax benefits.

Abbey Art Consultants, Inc., a company founded and controlled by David Ehrlich, engaged in the business of acquiring artwork, storing it, and facilitating its donation to charitable organizations so that customers could claim charitable contribution deductions equal to the artworks’ appraised fair market value. Customers typically paid a small deposit, often only five to ten percent of the quoted purchase price, and were told that ownership of the artwork began when pieces were “set aside” for them in storage. Abbey Art then held the artwork for approximately one year before arranging for donation and providing customers with appraisals and prefilled tax documentation claiming deductions significantly higher than the amounts paid for the art.

In 2021, the IRS assessed penalties against Ehrlich under Section 6700 for promoting an abusive tax shelter through false statements concerning the availability of tax benefits. After Ehrlich paid a portion of the penalty and filed a refund suit, the government counterclaimed for additional penalties exceeding $1 million. Following Ehrlich’s death, his estate was substituted as the plaintiff.

The court first addressed the applicable standard of proof for Section 6700 violations. Although many courts apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard based on Fifth Circuit precedent and analogous fraud provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. Applying that heightened standard, the court concluded that the government had met its burden on all required elements.

To establish liability under Section 6700(a)(2)(A), the government was required to show that Ehrlich made or caused others to make false or fraudulent statements about material matters relating to tax benefits and that he knew or had reason to know the statements were false. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Ehrlich made material misrepresentations in two primary areas. First, he represented to clients that they acquired ownership of artwork when it was segregated in storage or when a small deposit was paid. Second, he advised clients that they could claim charitable deductions based on appraised values and rely on those appraisals for tax purposes.

The court concluded that customers did not obtain ownership of the artwork when it was merely set aside because clients had no binding obligation to pay the remaining balance and Abbey Art could not enforce payment. Accordingly, the arrangements amounted to options to purchase rather than completed sales. Without a transfer of ownership, the on-year holding period never commenced.

The court also rejected the estate’s argument that client testimony regarding their subjective belief that they owned the art was sufficient to create a factual dispute. The absence of enforceable contracts, the ability to refund or revise deposits, and the lack of client possession or identification of specific artwork supported the conclusion that Ehrlich’s ownership representations were false as a matter of law.

Further, the court found that Ehrlich knew or should have known that his statements were false. He did not rely on advice from tax professionals, exercised full control over the company’s operations, and was a sophisticated businessperson familiar with tax matters. Importantly, Ehrlich was aware of prior court decisions rejecting similar Abbey Art arrangements, which directly undermined his representations regarding ownership and holding periods. The court also held that statements made by Abbey Art’s employee could be attributed to Ehrlich because he directed and controlled the business and caused the statements to be made within the meaning of Section 6700.

Finally, the court upheld the IRS’s penalty calculation methodology. Section 6700 authorizes a penalty equal to 50 percent of the gross income derived from the prohibited activity. The court agreed with the government that the penalty should be based on Abbey Art’s overall gross income from the program rather than requiring proof of false statements for each individual transaction.

This decision highlights the risks faced by promoters of donation-based tax strategies and similar programs that depend on aggressive interpretations of ownership, valuation, or holding period rules. Courts will closely scrutinize whether customers truly acquire property interests sufficient to support charitable contribution deductions and whether promoters’ representations align with established tax law. The ruling also highlights the broad reach of Section 6700, including the IRS’s ability to impose penalties equal to half of the gross income generated by an abusive scheme and to attribute employee statements to the individual controlling the operation. 

As enforcement efforts continue to focus on abusive charitable deduction arrangements and tax shelter promotions, this case serves as a reminder that misstatements about tax benefits can lead to significant penalty exposure and litigation risk. If you have questions about this update, please contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, John Rouchell, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari and visit our Tax practice page. 

Blogs

Proposed Regulations for Section 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit, Provide Greater Certainty for Biofuel Producers

February 4, 20262 minute read

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The Internal Revenue Service recently released proposed regulations implementing the Section 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit after statutory changes enacted in last year’s tax legislation expanded and extended the credit through 2029. Although the rules are not yet final, the proposed regulations provide long-awaited clarity after years of uncertainty and are expected to encourage additional investment in low-carbon fuel production.

Section 45Z replaced a collection of prior fuel tax incentives and adopts a technology-neutral approach that rewards transportation fuels produced using low-emission methods. The value of the credit depends on the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of the fuel, making emissions modeling central to determining eligibility and benefit amounts. Farmers, fuel producers, fuel sellers, and airlines may all benefit from the credit, which applies to qualifying fuels produced beginning in 2025.

A key change in the proposed regulations revises guidance issued earlier this year that would have significantly limited eligibility by restricting “qualified sales” to fuel users only. That interpretation conflicted with standard industry distribution practices, which frequently involve wholesalers, dealers, and other intermediaries. The revised proposal broadens the definition of qualified sales, allowing sales through customary commercial channels to qualify for the credit. This change removes a major obstacle that had raised concerns among producers and potential credit purchasers and threatened to curtail participation in the program.

The proposed regulations also introduce compliance safe harbors related to substantiating emissions rates and documenting qualified sales. These provisions are intended to reduce administrative burdens and audit risk for taxpayers while providing a more workable framework for calculating and claiming the credit. Collectively, these revisions signal a more practical and commercially aligned regulatory approach.

Despite this progress, important uncertainties remain. Fuel producers continue to await updated guidance from the Department of Energy regarding the emissions modeling framework that taxpayers must use to calculate lifecycle greenhouse gas rates. Because emissions intensity directly determines the amount of the credit, this forthcoming model will play a central role in shaping both eligibility and economic outcomes for producers.

The Section 45Z credit has drawn bipartisan support but also criticism regarding its fiscal impact and effectiveness in reducing consumer fuel prices. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the extension and expansion of the credit will reduce federal revenues by approximately $25.7 billion over the 2025–2034 period. Critics argue that the credit disproportionately benefits fuels derived from corn and soybeans that already receive support under other public policies.

Nevertheless, the IRS’s proposed regulations represent a meaningful step toward regulatory certainty and program viability. By aligning the rules more closely with industry practices and providing substantiation safe harbors, the proposal is expected to increase market confidence and stimulate additional investment in clean fuel production. 

Fuel producers, distributors, and investors should begin evaluating how the proposed rules may affect their operations and consider submitting comments during the rulemaking process to address remaining technical and practical concerns. If you have questions about this update, please contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, John Rouchell, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari and visit our Tax practice page. 

Blogs

Data Centers Are the New Industrial Neighbors: Managing Risk of Nuisance and Environmental Litigation

January 29, 20263 minute read

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Earlier this week, the New Orleans City Council approved a one-year moratorium on new data centers while the city revisits how (and whether) to regulate them. The stated concerns—energy demand, water use, noise, air quality, and other neighborhood impacts—will sound familiar to anyone who has worked on siting disputes for refineries, chemical plants, pipelines, landfills, or other large industrial facilities.

What’s notable is not that a city hit pause. It’s why it did so, and what that signals about where legal risk around data centers is headed—particularly in environmental justice hotbeds like Louisiana and Texas.

As AI-driven load growth accelerates, data centers are increasingly being regulated—and litigated—like traditional industrial operations. The legal risk profile is starting to look very familiar to energy and heavy-industry counsel.

Below are a few trends to watch and pointers for managing risk.

1. Land-Use Disputes Are Becoming Environmental Cases on Day One

The New Orleans moratorium is framed as a zoning and planning issue, but the rhetoric is explicitly environmental: power consumption, water stress, diesel generators, noise, air quality, and cumulative neighborhood effects.

That rhetoric portends what fights are still to come – even when data centers are approved for construction, future legal risks will remain, including potential environmental administrative appeals, citizen suits, and tort claims. Given that environmental issues are likely to pervade zoning proceedings, permittees should be careful to create a record that not only accomplishes site approval, but also minimizes risk in future litigation.

2. Nuisance laws make data centers an easy target.

For data centers, the first wave of private litigation risk is unlikely to be classic toxic exposure claims. It’s nuisance.

Community outcries have already cited many complaints familiar to operators of industrial facilities: noise from cooling equipment, light pollution, truck traffic, vibration, and diesel exhaust from backup generators. Those alleged impacts (especially when combined with allegations of emotional distress and loss of quality of life) are comparatively easy to plead, emotionally resonant, and difficult to disprove, especially given the varying sensitivities among the population. In addition to investing in community relations, operators of data centers would be wise to study background levels of various potential annoyances (noise, dust, traffic, etc) prior to construction and operation of a data center, to help ward off potential future nuisance allegations.

3. Backup Generation Is No Longer “Invisible”

In addition to risk of tort and nuisance-based liability, facilities face risk of Clean Air Act citizen suits – particularly because of the rising need for backup power generation at data centers. In ERCOT territory and elsewhere, grid reliability concerns are pulling data centers’ backup power systems into the spotlight, as highlighted by federal emergency orders issued in the wake of recent severe winter weather. Thus, emergency diesel generators, gas turbines, and microgrids have become key operational features with real air-quality implications. 

This reliance on backup power presents familiar Clean Air Act compliance challenges, which EPA has already begun to address. EPA’s recent guidance includes its recent pronouncement that temporary methane gas turbines (such as those used at data centers) are subject to NSPS and require air permits – along with additional guidance with which data center operators should familiarize themselves.

Takeaways for managing risk 

New Orleans’ moratorium is a reflection of an emerging reality – data centers have become the new industrial neighbors, not only in the political sense, but also in terms of exposure to regulatory and litigation risks. For that reason, during land use fights, permittees should be careful not to craft a record that could prove damaging in future litigation – for example, by creating graphics that could make for harmful exhibits when used by plaintiffs in a different context, or by making commitments to neighbors that could create a “duty” enforceable through litigation.

Those who have been through refinery siting fights, pipeline opposition, or plant expansions will recognize the warning signs. The smart response is the same one industry has learned the hard way before: build the record as if you’ll be defending it—because eventually, you probably will.

For further questions regarding the New Orleans moratorium and other data center issues, contact Liskow attorney Michael Mims and visit our Environmental and Toxic Tort practice pages.

 

Blogs

Climate Analysis in Louisiana’s Coastal Permitting Regime: The Second Commonwealth LNG Petition

January 28, 20263 minute read

In October 2025, a district court in Cameron Parish granted a challenge brought by environmental justice groups who sought to vacate a coastal use permit (CUP) issued by the Office of Coastal Management (OCM) for the construction of an LNG facility. In granting petitioners’ challenge, the district court primarily cited OCM’s failure to analyze climate change and environmental justice impacts in issuing the permit. Two months later, the same petitioners—a collection of national and state non-profit environmental groups—are petitioning the same district court to vacate the “re-issued” CUP for substantially similar reasons but also for failing to abide by lawful permitting procedures.

The original permit authorized Commonwealth LNG, LLC to build a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) export terminal along the Calcasieu Ship Channel. During the application process, petitioners submitted public comments, expressing concerns regarding the Parish’s wetlands from dredging, as well as the interference with use and access of the Ship Channel by fisherman and boaters.

In October 2025, the district court vacated the original coastal use permit, holding that OCM failed to comply with the Louisiana Constitution, the Coastal Resources Program, and its own regulations. Among the several deficiencies identified, the court focused on OCM’s failure to meaningfully evaluate climate impacts and cumulative effects, particularly in light of the concentration of other LNG facilities in Cameron Parish.

Rather than initiate an entirely new permitting process with renewed notice and public comment, OCM issued a “Revised Basis of Decision” to address the factors that the district court found lacking in its original analysis. The Petitioners’ December 2025 petition for judicial review once again challenges the “re-issued” permit for the Commonwealth LNG export terminal in Cameron Parish. The petition argues that once the permit was vacated, it ceased to exist; any subsequent authorization required a new administrative process and a fresh substantive analysis; and it raises the question to what extent Louisiana agencies must consider climate impacts in coastal zone decision‑making.

Permitting Procedures for re-issuing a vacated CUP

Central to the petitioners’ challenge is the procedural viability of re-issuing a virtually identical CUP after a court vacates the original permit without going through an entirely new permit application process. While petitioners acknowledge that OCM does not have rules addressing the process for re-issuing a CUP, they interpret this silence as a need to start anew from the beginning of the permitting process.

The Public Trust Doctrine and Substantive Obligations

Alternatively, Petitioners argue that OCM did not remedy the deficiencies identified by the court in its October 2025 decision, which included a violation of Louisiana’s constitutional public trust doctrine. Citing to Louisiana’s Constitution and a handful of court decisions, Petitioners contend that OCM has a mandate—as a “public trustee” of the state’s natural resources—to consider or mitigate environmental impacts. The petition contends that OCM’s revised decision fails to do so and that while the agency purported to conduct an “independent analysis” of the factors the district court said it must consider, its analysis was actually derived from an environmental review conducted by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). According to petitioners, that analysis has already been criticized by a federal appellate court for insufficiently addressing air pollution and health impacts associated with LNG exports. By adopting those conclusions wholesale and labeling them and “independent analysis” the petition argues that OCM failed to conduct the state‑specific evaluation required under Louisiana law.

Broader Implications

This case reflects a continuing trend in which concerns over climate change are the basis for challenging the issuance of permits.

Ultimately, the petition presents a question increasingly central to climate litigation: what is the proper balance between the continued use of fossil fuel infrastructure and climate impacts. Louisiana’s resolution of this issue may carry significant weight for future permitting decisions.

For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Kelly Becker, Jamie Rhymes, and Andrew Hughes, and visit Liskow’s Environmental – Regulatory & Litigation practice page.

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DOJ Issues Final Rule Eliminating Disparate Impact from its Title VI Enforcement Regulations

January 28, 20262 minute read

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On December 10, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued a final rule amending its regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”) to eliminate the disparate-impact prohibitions in the rule. Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs receiving federal financial assistance. The prior DOJ regulations implemented this prohibition to extend beyond intentional discrimination and prohibit facially neutral actions that result in disparate impacts, or disproportionate adverse effects, on protected classes. 

DOJ takes the position that the disparate impact requirements in the prior regulations are beyond the agency’s statutory authority under Title VI. The final rule notes that the previous DOJ regulations prohibiting conduct that has an unintentional disparate impact “are in considerable tension” with both Title VI and the Constitution, and the amendments will serve “to more closely align [DOJ’s] regulations with the language that Congress enacted in Title VI prohibiting intentional discriminatory conduct.” DOJ rescinded several portions of its Title VI implementing regulations, including:

  • The full text of 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2), which prohibited the utilization of “criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin”
  • The two uses of the phrase “or effect” from 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), which provided that a funding recipient may not make selections of a site or location of facilities with the “purpose or effect” of discriminating, or “with the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of” Title VI or DOJ’s implementing regulations
  • The full text of 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(6), which authorized a funding recipient to take affirmative action “to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin”

Under the prior regulations, Title VI served as an enforcement mechanism to implement Environmental Justice (“EJ”)—a framework that has faced increased scrutiny under the Trump administration’s deregulatory agenda, and DOJ’s final rule aligns with the administration’s broader trend of administrative rollback on enforcement of EJ-related issues. While federal EJ requirements and tools have become stale, these changes do not disturb state legislative and state court mandates concerning EJ, and industry should stay apprised of jurisdictional developments as this legal landscape continues to evolve.

For more information and updates regarding this topic, contact Liskow attorneys Greg Johnson, Clare Bienvenu, Emily von Qualen, and Colin North, and visit Liskow’s The Louisiana Industrial Insights Hub. 

"The practical impact of this rule's modifications will be to make clear to Department Federal-funding recipients that the Department's Title VI regulations do not prohibit conduct or activities that have a disparate impact and prohibit only intentional discrimination, and the Department thus will not pursue Title VI disparate-impact liability against its Federal-funding recipients."

www.federalregister.gov/…

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