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Climate Analysis in Louisiana’s Coastal Permitting Regime: The Second Commonwealth LNG Petition

3 minute read

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In October 2025, a district court in Cameron Parish granted a challenge brought by environmental justice groups who sought to vacate a coastal use permit (CUP) issued by the Office of Coastal Management (OCM) for the construction of an LNG facility. In granting petitioners’ challenge, the district court primarily cited OCM’s failure to analyze climate change and environmental justice impacts in issuing the permit. Two months later, the same petitioners—a collection of national and state non-profit environmental groups—are petitioning the same district court to vacate the “re-issued” CUP for substantially similar reasons but also for failing to abide by lawful permitting procedures.

The original permit authorized Commonwealth LNG, LLC to build a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) export terminal along the Calcasieu Ship Channel. During the application process, petitioners submitted public comments, expressing concerns regarding the Parish’s wetlands from dredging, as well as the interference with use and access of the Ship Channel by fisherman and boaters.

In October 2025, the district court vacated the original coastal use permit, holding that OCM failed to comply with the Louisiana Constitution, the Coastal Resources Program, and its own regulations. Among the several deficiencies identified, the court focused on OCM’s failure to meaningfully evaluate climate impacts and cumulative effects, particularly in light of the concentration of other LNG facilities in Cameron Parish.

Rather than initiate an entirely new permitting process with renewed notice and public comment, OCM issued a “Revised Basis of Decision” to address the factors that the district court found lacking in its original analysis. The Petitioners’ December 2025 petition for judicial review once again challenges the “re-issued” permit for the Commonwealth LNG export terminal in Cameron Parish. The petition argues that once the permit was vacated, it ceased to exist; any subsequent authorization required a new administrative process and a fresh substantive analysis; and it raises the question to what extent Louisiana agencies must consider climate impacts in coastal zone decision‑making.

Permitting Procedures for re-issuing a vacated CUP

Central to the petitioners’ challenge is the procedural viability of re-issuing a virtually identical CUP after a court vacates the original permit without going through an entirely new permit application process. While petitioners acknowledge that OCM does not have rules addressing the process for re-issuing a CUP, they interpret this silence as a need to start anew from the beginning of the permitting process.

The Public Trust Doctrine and Substantive Obligations

Alternatively, Petitioners argue that OCM did not remedy the deficiencies identified by the court in its October 2025 decision, which included a violation of Louisiana’s constitutional public trust doctrine. Citing to Louisiana’s Constitution and a handful of court decisions, Petitioners contend that OCM has a mandate—as a “public trustee” of the state’s natural resources—to consider or mitigate environmental impacts. The petition contends that OCM’s revised decision fails to do so and that while the agency purported to conduct an “independent analysis” of the factors the district court said it must consider, its analysis was actually derived from an environmental review conducted by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). According to petitioners, that analysis has already been criticized by a federal appellate court for insufficiently addressing air pollution and health impacts associated with LNG exports. By adopting those conclusions wholesale and labeling them an “independent analysis” the petition argues that OCM failed to conduct the state‑specific evaluation required under Louisiana law.

Broader Implications

This case reflects a continuing trend in which concerns over climate change are the basis for challenging the issuance of permits.

Ultimately, the petition presents a question increasingly central to climate litigation: what is the proper balance between the continued use of fossil fuel infrastructure and climate impacts. Louisiana’s resolution of this issue may carry significant weight for future permitting decisions.

For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Kelly Becker, Jamie Rhymes, and Andrew Hughes, and visit Liskow’s Environmental – Regulatory & Litigation practice page.

Why Employers Everywhere Should Be Watching DOJ v. Minnesota

3 minute read

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What the DOJ’s Lawsuit Against Minnesota Signals for DEI in the Workplace

The U.S. Department of Justice’s January 14, 2026 lawsuit against the State of Minnesota continues the evolving relationship between civil rights law and workplace DEI efforts. Filed under Title VII, the complaint challenges Minnesota’s long‑standing affirmative action framework for state employment—arguing that the state’s use of race‑ and sex‑conscious hiring goals, demographic availability analyses, and pre‑hire justification requirements constitutes a “pattern or practice” of unlawful discrimination.

While the case is directed at a single state, its implications extend far beyond Minnesota. The DOJ’s lawsuit includes a designation by Attorney General Pam Bondi that the case is a matter of “general public importance,” which is designed to secure expedited review by a three-judge panel at the district court level and a direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  The complaint acknowledges that the DOJ’s claims are contrary to long-standing Supreme Court precedent, and it is clearly inviting the current justices to overturn that precedent. 

Public agencies, private employers, and DEI leaders across the country should view this lawsuit as a bold statement of the Administration’s assault on identity‑conscious employment practices in the post–Students for Fair Admissions era.  While a Supreme Court reversal of affirmative action precedent is neither certain nor likely to happen imminently, employers need to recognize the ramifications of a potential ruling in the DOJ’s favor and evaluate their DEI efforts and the possibility that the DOJ could target them, too.

What the DOJ Is Challenging

Minnesota’s statutory scheme requires agencies to:

  • Track the “underutilization” of a protected group in their workforce
  • Compare that data to civilian labor‑market availability
  • Identify “underutilization” of protected groups
  • Establish numerical goals to address those disparities
  • Submit pre‑hire justifications when selecting candidates outside those groups.

The DOJ argues that these requirements necessarily classify applicants by race and sex and impose procedural burdens on some candidates because of those characteristics. Under the complaint’s theory, even well‑intentioned efforts to increase representation can violate Title VII if race or sex plays any role in the employment decision.

This reflects a shift toward a stricter reading of Title VII’s “because of” standard, which leaves little to no space for demographic-based considerations, even when described as remedial.

Why This Matters Now

The lawsuit arrives at a time when employers are already reassessing DEI programs in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. The message from federal courts and the DOJ has become increasingly clear: employment decisions must rely on job‑related criteria and remain race‑neutral, rather than driven by demographic benchmarks.

For DEI leaders, this means the legal risk landscape is changing. Practices that were once considered permissible—such as setting representation goals or requiring diverse interview slates—may now be scrutinized as evidence of intentional discrimination.

The Tension for Employers

Organizations committed to equity face a real challenge. Persistent disparities in hiring and advancement are well‑documented. Clients and communities expect institutions to build workforces that reflect the populations they serve. Yet Title VII prohibits treating individuals differently because of race or sex, even for remedial purposes, unless tied to specific findings of past discrimination.

The Minnesota case underscores this tension. The DOJ does not dispute the value of inclusive workplaces; instead, it argues that demographic disparities alone cannot justify race‑conscious measures. In other words, good intentions do not insulate employers from liability.

A Path Forward

The legal environment does not eliminate DEI—it reshapes it. Employers can continue advancing equity by shifting from outcome‑based strategies to process‑based ones. Effective, legally sound approaches include:

  • Broadening outreach and recruitment pipelines
  • Using structured interviews and skills‑based assessments
  • Reviewing job descriptions for unnecessary barriers
  • Training managers on bias‑resistant decision‑making
  • Strengthening mentorship, sponsorship, and development pathways
  • Focusing on culture, belonging, and retention.

These strategies promote fairness and opportunity without relying on race‑ or sex‑specific preferences.

Conclusion

The DOJ’s lawsuit against Minnesota is a reminder that DEI work must evolve alongside the law. Employers should review existing policies, ensure that demographic data informs—but does not drive—employment decisions, and center their efforts on equitable processes rather than numerical targets.

Equity and compliance are not mutually exclusive. With thoughtful design, organizations can honor both their legal obligations and their commitment to building workplaces where all employees can thrive.

For more information regarding this topic, reach out to Liskow attorneys Cherrell Taplin and Tommy McGoey and visit Liskow’s Labor and Employment practice page. 

"…Minnesota law requires the state to discriminate against its current and prospective employees on the basis of race and sex. But this is not just an ineffective plan to stop discrimination. It is an unlawful plan. To break this discrimination chain once and for all, the United States of America brings this action against the State of Minnesota under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964…"

www.justice.gov/…

D.C. Circuit Rejects EPA’s Bid to Partially Vacate PFAS Drinking Water Rule

2 minute read

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On Wednesday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied EPA’s request to partially vacate portions of its 2024 PFAS drinking water rule in American Water Works Association, et al. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 24-1188. In a short per curiam order, a unanimous three-judge panel (Judges Millett, Pan, and Garcia) concluded that “the merits of the parties’ positions are not so clear as to warrant summary action,” and refused to unwind the rule while the case proceeds on the merits. The decision keeps the Biden-era standards fully in place—for now.

The case arises from EPA’s first-ever National Primary Drinking Water Regulation (NPDWR) establishing enforceable limits for six PFAS compounds under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Water sector petitioners, including the American Water Works Association and the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, challenged the rule as technically flawed and procedurally defective. After the change in administration, EPA took the unusual step of moving the court to partially vacate the rule for four PFAS compounds (but seeking to keep in place the limits for PFOA and PFOS), effectively seeking to undo parts of its own regulation mid-litigation. A collection of intervenors – composed of the Natural Resources Defense Council and other advocacy groups – opposed EPA’s motion.

The D.C. Circuit was not persuaded that such relief was appropriate at this early stage and denied the motion to vacate. The court also denied several related procedural motions, including requests for expanded intervenor briefing, signaling an intent to keep the case on a relatively disciplined track as it moves forward.

Importantly, the order does not resolve the legality of the PFAS standards themselves. Instead, it preserves the regulatory status quo while the court considers full briefing on the merits. That posture is consistent with recent D.C. Circuit precedent—most notably NRDC v. Regan—that limits EPA’s ability to walk back final Safe Drinking Water Act determinations once they have been made. In that context, the court’s refusal to grant partial vacatur may reflect skepticism toward efforts to achieve through litigation what the statute may not permit through administrative reversal.

What comes next is a compressed merits schedule. Petitioners’ reply briefs are due February 20, 2026, followed by final briefs on March 6, 2026, at which point EPA must also identify any arguments it no longer advances in defense of the rule. The case will then be teed up for argument and a decision that could have lasting implications not only for PFAS regulation, but for how far an administration can go in retreating from its predecessor’s environmental rules once statutory obligations have been triggered.

For further questions regarding this case and other PFAS issues, contact Liskow attorneys Michael Mims, Emily von Qualen, and visit our pages for our Environmental and Toxic Tort practices.

LDEQ Finalizes Regulations Amending the State’s Voluntary Environmental Self-Audit Program

2 minute read

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On January 20, 2026, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”) published a final rule in the Louisiana Register that promulgated amendments to its voluntary environmental self-audit regulations, largely adopting the August 2025 proposed changes “to aid the department in continued implementation of the self-audit program.”

These amendments add several definitions for key program terms, including, inter alia, “date of discovery”: the time “when the owner or operator of a facility has an objectively reasonable basis for believing a violation has, or may have occurred.” The amendments refine the program scope to require disclosure of violations within 30 days of the end of the audit period. Additionally, the amendments clarify that an environmental audit must be completed within six months of the audit commencement date, though extensions may be granted if requested with sufficient justification at least 30 days before the audit period expires. Finally, the amendments provide that owners/operators who cannot complete corrective actions within 90 days after the date of discovery of the violation(s) must submit to the LDEQ monthly progress reports documenting implementation of the corrective actions until their completion. 

LDEQ has also posted updated Notice of Audit and Disclosure of Violation(s) forms on its website, in addition to an updated guidance document, titled Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality: Environmental Self-Audit Program Explained. 

For more information regarding this topic, contact Liskow attorneys Greg Johnson, Clare Bienvenu, Emily von Qualen, and Colin North, and visit Liskow’s The Louisiana Industrial Insights Hub. 

"Based on implementation of the program and feedback from
participants, the department has determined that revisions
were necessary to aid in further implementation of the
program."

www.doa.la.gov/…

How PFAS Exposure Is Driving a New Era of Personal Injury Claims

4 minute read

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Understanding PFAS Personal Injury Claims

Public concern about PFAS—often called “forever chemicals”—has grown as regulators prioritize the issue, and as more communities learn about potential contamination in drinking water, soil, and consumer products. These synthetic compounds have been used for decades in manufacturing, firefighting foam, and everyday items designed to resist heat, water, or stains. Their durability, while useful in industry, also means that certain types of PFAS may linger in the environment and accumulate in the human body. As a result, PFAS exposure has become the focus of significant litigation, including a rising number of personal injury claims. The prevalence of such lawsuits will grow as regulators continue to adopt unforgiving concentration limits (often in the parts per trillion), which will fuel the plaintiff bar in targeting industry clients. 

How PFAS Exposure Occurs

PFAS are utilized in a vast number of consumer goods and industrial processes – including food packaging, firefighting foams, and myriad other applications. PFAS can enter the environment through industrial discharges, the use of firefighting foam, or the breakdown of consumer products. Given the innumerable sources of PFAS, they are often also found at “background” levels – in other words, they are present in the environment, but their origin is unclear. Once present in the environment, PFAS can migrate into groundwater and drinking water systems, particularly in areas near manufacturing facilities, airports, and military bases. Workers in certain industries and firefighters may also face higher exposure levels due to the nature of their jobs.

Because PFAS are so widespread, many (or perhaps most) individuals have likely been exposed to PFAS in some fashion. Such exposure typically gives rise to a personal injury claim when a person believes the exposure was significant, traceable to a particular source, and connected to a diagnosed health condition.

Why Individuals Are Filing Claims

People pursuing PFAS personal injury claims generally allege that manufacturers or users of PFAS‑containing products failed to warn about potential risks or did not take reasonable steps to limit environmental releases. Such lawsuits are not limited to manufacturers and intentional users of PFAS. Defendants also include passive receivers of PFAS – in other words, facilities that do not intentionally use PFAS, but who nevertheless discharge water or other material that is (knowingly or unknowingly) tainted with PFAS given its prevalence in the environment. These cases often appear alongside broader litigation involving water providers and municipalities, but personal injury claims focus on the individual—what they were exposed to, how long the exposure lasted, and what health effects they experienced.

PFAS‑Related Claims Emerging Nationwide

Courts are seeing a wide range of claims, including:

  • Consumer product claims alleging that items such as cookware, textiles, cosmetics, and food packaging contained PFAS without adequate disclosure.
  • Environmental contamination and cleanup claims brought by states, municipalities, and water systems seeking reimbursement for investigation, remediation, and monitoring costs.
  • AFFF (“Aqueous Film-Forming Foam”)‑related claims involving both personal injury suits by firefighters and environmental claims tied to historical foam use at airports and military bases.
  • Insurance coverage disputes over whether PFAS‑related liabilities trigger defense or indemnity obligations.
  • Property damage and economic loss claims involving diminished property value or the cost of filtration systems.
  • Agricultural claims tied to PFAS‑contaminated soil, water, or livestock.
  • Drinking water exposure in communities near industrial sites, airports, or military installations.
  • Occupational exposure, particularly among firefighters and workers in manufacturing settings.

Claimants typically identify a specific health condition they believe is connected to PFAS exposure including various cancers, multiple sclerosis, and infant mortality. The strength of these claims often depends on the available scientific research, medical documentation, and the ability to link exposure to a particular source. These categories continue to expand as testing increases and regulatory scrutiny grows.

Considerations for Companies and Other Entities Facing PFAS Claims

Businesses, municipalities, and other organizations may also find themselves named in PFAS lawsuits. Early evaluation typically focuses on:

  • Historical use or disposal of PFAS‑containing materials
  • Environmental sampling data and regulatory filings
  • Operational changes that may demonstrate improved controls
  • Insurance coverage and notice obligations
  • Whether related claims are proceeding within multidistrict litigation

A clear understanding of the factual record is essential to navigating these claims effectively.

Companies should also consider attorney-client privilege issues when evaluating their risk of PFAS liability. Given the ubiquity of PFAS in the environment and the critical stakes involved, companies should proceed with caution before generating data that could prove discoverable in future litigation.

Finally, in real estate and other transactions, companies should focus on PFAS liability during due diligence considerations. Companies should be careful not to purchase a business or facility that will lead to undue exposure to PFAS liability. 

A Legal Landscape Still Taking Shape

PFAS litigation continues to evolve as scientific research develops, and regulators consider new limits on PFAS in drinking water and consumer products. Further, as various pending PFAS mass tort cases unfold, the resulting jury verdicts will influence the marketing and litigation strategies employed by the plaintiff bar. Courts are beginning to address personal injury claims more directly, but the legal standards are still emerging. For individuals, companies, and communities, this means navigating a complex mix of science, regulation, and litigation strategy.

For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Cherrell Simms Taplin and Michael Mims, or visit Liskow’s Toxic Tort, Mass Torts & Class Actions and Environmental – Regulatory & Litigation practice page.

Fifth Circuit Limits Tax Court’s Authority to Recharacterize State-Law Limited Partners for Self-Employment Tax Purposes

2 minute read

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that state-law limited partners are exempt from self-employment taxes on their distributive shares of partnership income without being subjected to a fact-intensive inquiry into whether they function as passive investors. Vacating and remanding a contrary decision of the U.S. Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit held that the Tax Court applied an unduly restrictive standard when it increased the taxable net earnings from self-employment of the partners of Sirius Solutions LLLP, a Houston-based management consulting firm.  

The Fifth Circuit rejected the Tax Court’s fact-intensive conclusion that a limited partner is one who is truly a passive investor. The majority explained that the proper inquiry for taxpayers within the Fifth Circuit is whether an individual is a limited partner under applicable state law, not whether the partner meets a judicially created standard of passivity. The court concluded that a “limited partner” is best understood as a partner who enjoys limited liability under state partnership law. Because Sirius’s partners were designated as limited partners under state law, the Tax Court should have relied on that classification rather than substituting its own functional test.

The court emphasized that this interpretation aligns more closely with the statutory text and congressional intent. The majority also noted that dictionary definitions support reading “limited partner, as such” to mean a partner in a limited partnership who has limited liability. In the court’s view, nothing in the statute authorizes courts to impose an additional requirement that such partners must also be passive investors to qualify for the exemption.

Although the ruling is binding only within the Fifth Circuit, it has broad implications for limited partners, and more importantly for limited liability company members, as almost every member of a limited liability company has no personal liability for company debts. 

The decision also comes against the backdrop of other pending self-employment tax disputes involving investment management partnerships, including Denham Capital Management LP v. Commissioner and Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, which are currently on appeal in the First and Second Circuits. Those cases raise similar questions about the scope of the Section 1402(a)(13) exemption and could ultimately produce divergent interpretations among the circuits.

One judge dissented, taking the position that Congress intended the limited partner exemption to apply only to passive investors. In his view, the record demonstrated that the Sirius partners were “limited” in name only and actively participated in the business, making them ineligible for the exemption. The dissent underscores the continuing debate over whether the statutory exclusion should turn on formal legal status or economic reality.

On remand, the Tax Court must reconsider the Sirius partners’ self-employment tax liability in a manner consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion. For now, the decision provides welcome clarity for state-law limited partners within the Fifth Circuit and may prompt partnerships to reexamine how state-law classifications interact with federal self-employment tax exposure. If you have questions about this update, please contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, John Rouchell, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari and visit our Tax practice page. 

Maximizing OBBBA Bonus Depreciation in Producing Oil and Gas Property Acquisitions

2 minute read

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On January 16, 2026, Liskow tax attorneys published a blog regarding IRS Notice 2026 – 11, which provides guidance on the implementation of the amendment to Internal Revenue Code section 168(k) made by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (“OBBBA”) reinstating 100 percent expensing for certain qualified depreciable property acquired after January 19, 2025.  The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 had amended section 168 to provide for 100 percent expensing for certain depreciable property, but the tax benefit of that amendment began to phase out 20 percent per year beginning for property placed in service after December 31, 2022, with total phaseout for depreciable property purchased after December 31, 2026. Among other things, IRS Notice 2026 – 11 provides interim guidance on how the IRS intends to determine the property acquisition date for purposes of new section 168(k) until proposed Treasury regulations are issued. 

Included in the depreciable property subject to 100 percent expensing is oil and gas lease and well equipment, gathering lines and gas processing plant and equipment (collectively, “Oil and Gas Equipment”) acquired from a party who is unrelated to the purchaser and that has not been used by the purchaser prior to the acquisition. Assuming that the purchaser expects to incur a federal income tax liability for the year of acquisition, the purchaser of a producing oil and gas property can use 100 percent expensing to reduce that tax liability and increase cash flow from the acquisition through proper drafting of the oil and gas property purchase and sale agreement (“PSA”). 

The PSA first needs to allocate the total consideration for the purchase among the oil and gas properties subject to the PSA. This typically is done through the “Allocated Values” schedule included in most PSAs. This schedule, while key for federal tax purposes, is also used in determining the reduction in purchase price should one or more oil and gas properties drop out of the transaction due to title or environmental issues, casualty loss or the exercise of a preferential right to purchase held by a party other than the purchaser.  

The PSA, either on the Allocated Values schedule or on another tax schedule, should further break down the allocated value of each oil and gas property between depreciable Oil and Gas Equipment and depletable oil and gas reserves. The purchaser should consider negotiating for an allocation to Oil and Gas Equipment that is the highest value that can be supported by data in the market. Further, the PSA should contain a provision that the agreed consideration allocated to Oil and Gas Equipment represents the fair market value of the Oil and Gas Equipment. Finally, the PSA should contain a provision requiring the parties to each report the agreed fair market value of the Oil and Gas Equipment on IRS Form 8594. With these steps, the consideration allocated to Oil and Gas Equipment in the PSA should be the amount subject to 100 percent expensing on the purchaser’s federal income tax return for the taxable year of the oil and gas property acquisition. 

For more information regarding this topic, reach out to Liskow attorney John Bradford, and visit Liskow’s Tax practice page. 

IRS Publishes 100% Bonus Depreciation Guidance

2 minute read

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The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department have released guidance implementing the expanded “bonus depreciation” provisions enacted last July as part of the GOP’s sweeping tax-and-spending legislation. In Notice 2026-11, issued January 14, 2026, Treasury and the IRS announced their intent to propose regulations under Section 168(k) to carry out the new rules.

The revised bonus depreciation framework permits taxpayers to immediately expense 100% of the cost of certain qualifying capital assets, rather than recovering those costs over the assets’ useful lives. The provision is designed to stimulate business investment by accelerating the tax benefits associated with capital expenditures. Section 168(k) applies to “qualified property,” which generally includes depreciable tangible property with a MACRS recovery period of 20 years or less, such as machinery, equipment, furniture, vehicles, and certain land improvements, as well as qualified improvement property to nonresidential real estate. It also encompasses specified intangible assets, including off-the-shelf computer software and certain film, television, live theatrical, and sound recording production costs, provided the property is properly acquired and placed in service during an eligible tax year. 

Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, businesses were previously allowed full expensing of capital investments, but that benefit was being gradually phased out and was scheduled to expire entirely by 2027. The newly enacted legislation reverses that trajectory by permanently restoring 100% immediate expensing. Notice 2026-11 provides guidance on the types of property eligible for full expensing and outlines how taxpayers may make certain bonus depreciation elections. It also clarifies that qualified sound recording production costs are treated as eligible property for purposes of bonus depreciation. Treasury and the IRS indicated that forthcoming proposed regulations are expected to align with the positions set forth in the notice.

The notice does not address the law’s expansion of bonus depreciation under Section 168(n) to include “qualified production property,” such as assets used in manufacturing or refining activities. Treasury and the IRS noted that this aspect of the legislation is expected to be the subject of separate guidance. If you have questions about this update, please contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, John Rouchell, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari and visit our Tax practice page. 

Louisiana’s New Comparative Fault Law: What Changed on January 1, 2026 — and Why It Matters

3 minute read

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On January 1, 2026, Louisiana closed the chapter on its long‑standing pure comparative fault system and moved to a modified approach that bars recovery once a plaintiff is found 51% at fault. With this shift, the Legislature has reshaped the way we evaluate responsibility and damages in personal injury, wrongful death, and other tort matters. The amendment to Civil Code article 2323 may look simple on paper, but in practice it marks a significant recalibration of how fault will be argued, allocated, and ultimately valued in courts and negotiations across the state. 

From Pure Comparative Fault to a 51% Bar: What’s the Difference?

Under the new modified comparative fault rule:

  • Incidents that occur on or after January 1, 2026 are governed by the new modified comparative fault rule.
  • Incidents that happened before that date remain under the former pure comparative fault system, even if the lawsuit is filed later and still timely.
  • For cases that fall near the transition date, this timing distinction will play a meaningful role in how the claim is evaluated and litigated.

This aligns Louisiana with the majority of U.S. jurisdictions that use some form of modified comparative fault. the 51% bar rule raises the stakes in fault allocation. Even a small shift in percentages can determine whether a plaintiff recovers anything at all.

Which Cases Are Affected?

The new rule applies to:

  • Injuries that occur on or after January 1, 2026.

The prior pure comparative fault system still governs:

  • Accidents occurring before January 1, 2026 — even if the lawsuit is filed later, as long as the claim is timely.

This distinction will matter significantly for cases straddling the transition period.

Why This Change Matters for Plaintiffs and Practitioners

The 51% bar rule raises the stakes in fault allocation. Even a small shift in percentages can determine whether a plaintiff recovers anything at all.

For plaintiffs:

  • Cases with disputed liability become riskier.
  • Injured individuals who appear initially “more at fault” may struggle to find counsel willing to invest in the case.
  • Early investigation becomes even more critical to preserve evidence and shape the narrative of fault.

For defense counsel:

  • The incentive to push plaintiffs over the 50% threshold becomes stronger.
  • Fault apportionment will likely become a central battleground in negotiations and at trial.

For the courts:

  • Expect more pre‑trial litigation over fault allocation.
  • Expect more motions challenging sufficiency of evidence on fault.

A Shift With Historical Weight

Louisiana’s approach to fault has shifted more than once, moving from contributory negligence to pure comparative fault and now to a modified system that draws a firm line at 51%. The most recent change, part of a broader tort reform effort in 2025, signals a clear policy decision: claims where plaintiffs carry most of the responsibility will face tighter limits on recovery.

Practical Example

If a plaintiff suffers $100,000 in damages:

  • Under the old system:
    If they were 75% at fault, they could still recover $25,000.
  • Under the new system:
    If they are 51% at fault, they recover nothing.
    If they are 40% at fault, they recover 60% of their damages.

The math has not changed — but the threshold has.

Final Thoughts

This reform will reshape the landscape of personal injury and tort litigation in Louisiana. For practitioners, it demands sharper early‑stage investigation, more rigorous fault analysis, and careful client counseling. For injured individuals, it underscores the importance of understanding how fault is determined.

As of January 1, 2026, Louisiana has officially transitioned from a "pure" comparative fault system to a modified comparative fault system with a 51% bar rule.

Three CCS Bills Prefiled for 2026 Louisiana Regular Session

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Speaker Pro Tempore Mike Johnson filed three CCS bills on January 12, which was the first day to prefile legislation for the Louisiana legislature’s 2026 Regular Session. Here’s a brief description of each:

  • HB 5 Authorizes parish governing authorities and citizens to determine whether Class VI injection wells, carbon dioxide sequestration, and carbon dioxide pipelines may be permitted within a parish.
  • HB 6 Authorizes the governing authority of Rapides Parish to determine whether carbon dioxide sequestration and pipelines transporting carbon dioxide may be permitted within the parish
  • HB 7 Enacts the Louisiana Landowners Protection Act, which repeals the CCS unitization statute and removes expropriation authority for CCS projects and carbon dioxide pipelines.

The Louisiana legislative regular session for 2026 is scheduled to begin on March 9.

For further inquiries, reach out to Liskow attorney and Louisiana Lobbyist Neil Abramson and CCS attorney Jeff Lieberman and visit our Carbon Capture & Storage practice page.