• Skip to content
  • Skip to primary sidebar

liskow_lewis_white_new

future-focused

  • Team
  • Practices
  • Insights
  • Blogs
    • Energy Law Blog
    • Gulf Coast Business Law Blog
    • Maritime Law Blog
    • Louisiana Industrial Insights Hub

Blogs

IRS Updates Guidance on the “No Tax on Overtime” Deduction

August 7, 20262 minute read

Featured Image

On August 6, 2026, the IRS released Fact Sheet 2026-13, an expanded set of FAQs on the qualified overtime compensation deduction created by the One, Big Beautiful Bill Act. The update replaces January’s FS-2026-01 and marks the shift from 2025’s transition relief to the full compliance framework now in effect.

The deduction allows eligible individuals to deduct up to $12,500 ($25,000 for joint filers) of qualified overtime compensation each year, phasing out once modified adjusted gross income exceeds $150,000 ($300,000 for joint filers). It is available to itemizers and non-itemizers alike, but it is a deduction, not an exclusion. Overtime pay is still fully subject to income tax withholding, Social Security, and unemployment taxes. And only overtime actually required by Section 7 of the FLSA qualifies; overtime paid under a union contract, state law, or company policy alone does not.

Eligibility still turns on FLSA status rather than job title. Executive, administrative, professional, outside sales, and other traditionally exempt employees generally cannot generate qualified overtime, even if their employer pays them overtime voluntarily. The new FAQs add a helpful clarification here: employee-owners with at least a bona fide 20% equity stake who are actively involved in management are typically treated as exempt executives, so overtime paid to them usually will not qualify either.

On calculation, the IRS reaffirms that only the “half” in “time-and-a-half” counts, meaning only the premium required by the FLSA will qualify for the deduction, not the full overtime payment. If an employer voluntarily pays more than the law requires, only the statutorily required premium is deductible. The guidance also walks through trickier scenarios, like healthcare and public-safety workers under alternative FLSA computation methods, and state/local government employees who receive compensatory time off instead of cash, where the deduction attaches only when compensation time is actually paid out.

The most consequential piece of this update is on reporting. Starting in 2026, employers must separately state qualified overtime compensation on Form W-2, Box 12, Code TT (or, rarely, on a 1099). Unlike 2025, there is no more relief for missing entries. An employee simply cannot deduct overtime that is not reported this way. If an employer overstates the amount, the employee is limited to what was actually paid; if an employer understates it, the employee’s only fix is to request a corrected W-2c, and a self-prepared Form 4852 will not substitute. Employers also cannot unilaterally reduce withholding for the anticipated deduction unless the employee submits a new Form W-4 reflecting it.

A few other eligibility rules round out the guidance: employees need a Social Security number valid for employment, married couples must file jointly to claim the deduction, and federal employees are subject to a parallel, OPM-administered framework with its own rules for hours worked and compensatory time.

Given how much now hinges on accurate FLSA classification and precise W-2 reporting, employers should review their payroll practices and correct any errors promptly, while employees who spot a discrepancy on their W-2 should raise it with their employer well before filing season. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

Louisiana Makes DOE’s Nuclear Shortlist

July 31, 20262 minute read

Featured Image

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has selected Louisiana and four other states to move forward as potential hosts for Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses, a federal initiative intended to strengthen the nation’s nuclear fuel cycle, from fuel production to the final disposition of used nuclear fuel. . Louisiana, Idaho, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah were selected from a pool of 26 applicant states and have each signed a memorandum of understanding to further evaluate potential campus locations. According to the DOE, a campus could attract up to $50 billion in capital investment, generate as much as $10 billion in state and local tax revenue, and create nearly 25,000 jobs. 

Louisiana’s proposal, which was lead by the Louisiana Department of Conservation & Energy (C&E) in conjunction with Louisiana Economic Development (LED), envisions a multi-site campus model across three specialized hubs: 

  1. LSU Innovation Park in Baton Rouge: would serve as the main hub for supply chain fabrication, heavy component manufacturing, materials testing, fuel conversion and enrichment, and workforce training.
  2. Military Installation in Northwest Louisiana: proposed for the testing and deployment of advanced small modular reactors (SMR) technology in a partnership with the Department of War and a large regional energy supplier.
  3. Port Fourchon Research Station: would be established to explore the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for geologic sequestration of spent nuclear fuel, specifically the offshore salt domes (and/or other strata). 

The proposal also addresses Louisiana-specific considerations that would require further development as the initiative moves forward, including workforce and supply chain development, infrastructure investment, permitting and regulatory coordination, legislative issues, and public engagement. The DOE is expected to select the final host states later this year, after which the selected states will negotiate and sign formal hosting agreements. The initial timetable contemplates bringing the first campus facilities online as early as 2027.

For further questions regarding this topic, contact Liskow attorney Cristian Soler.

Blogs

Louisiana Rewrites the Rules of Getting Paid: What Act 822 of 2026 Means for Companies Involved in Industrial Construction

July 31, 20262 minute read

Featured Image

Act 822 of the 2026 Regular Session (House Bill 638, by Representative Jacob Landry) is a dramatic change in Louisiana private construction law. It amends and reenacts Louisiana’s private prompt-payment statute (La. R.S. § 9:2784) into a comprehensive prompt-payment regime that runs from the top of the payment chain to the bottom.  The new rule becomes effective August 1, 2026.

Three features make Act 822 highly consequential for companies involved in industrial construction. First, the Act imposes a direct, enforceable duty on owners to pay their contractors on a fixed statutory deadline. Second, it dramatically increases and restructures the penalties for late payments by contractors and subcontractors. Third, it declares that “[a] waiver of a provision of this Section shall be absolutely null.” That converts the payment timeline from a set of default rules the parties could contract around into a mandatory floor that private contracts cannot lower.

Under Act 822, if an owner of immovable property receives a written payment request from a contractor for an amount payable under a construction contract, the owner must pay the amount owed no later than thirty-five days after receiving the request, in the absence of a good-faith dispute. 

Act 822 provides that contractors and subcontractors must pay their subcontractors within seven days of receiving payment, absent a good-faith dispute.  If a good-faith dispute exists, the new law requires any undisputed amounts to be paid within the seven days of receiving payment. The law provides that a good-faith dispute includes a dispute over whether the work was “performed in a proper manner under the contract.”

If the owner, contractor, or subcontractor fails to pay pursuant to the statutory deadlines, it is subject to a penalty of 1.5% of the unpaid amount per month.

Act 822 also provides that if an action for payment is brought, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney fees and court costs.

Importantly, Act 822 carves out contracts related to the oil and gas industry.

Given the language in Act 822 preventing companies from contracting around its deadlines, it will be important for companies working in construction in Louisiana to ensure their accounting procedures will timely fulfill the strict payment obligations created by Act 822.

For further questions regarding what Act 822 of 2026 means for companies involved in industrial construction or related topics, contact Liskow attorney Hunter Chauvin.

Blogs

House Advances Sweeping Maritime Reforms in FY27 Defense Bill

July 29, 20262 minute read

Featured Image

On July 22, 2026, the House narrowly approved the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8800) by a vote of 216 to 212, sending the measure to the Senate. Tucked inside the massive defense policy bill are two amendments that, together, amount to the broadest rewrite of federal maritime law in a generation.

A New Shipbuilding and Governance Framework

The first amendment, sponsored by Seapower Subcommittee Chair Trent Kelly (R-MS), reworks the “Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security for America Act.” Among its most notable features, the bill would create a new maritime security advisor position within the Executive Office of the President to lead a Maritime Security Board and coordinate the country’s overall maritime strategy. It also sets up a Maritime Security Trust Fund, capped at $20 billion, to support shipbuilding and the broader industrial base, with actual funding left to future budget requests.

On cargo preference, the amendment would push the government cargo requirement from 50 percent to a full 100 percent, consolidate waiver decisions with the Maritime Administrator, and create a new “Ship America Office” to oversee compliance. A related grant program would direct federal dollars toward vessel construction and shipyard investment, subject to Buy America restrictions. The bill would also rewrite parts of the 1851 Limitation of Liability Act, imposing a higher liability cap on foreign vessel owners than on US owners, and would extend Federal Maritime Commission oversight of unfair practices to passenger fares. More than 20 sections focus on workforce development, covering education funding, mariner recruitment, and career retention.

Coast Guard and a New Commercial Cargo Regime

The second amendment, introduced by Coast Guard Subcommittee Chair Mike Ezell (R-MS), implements several proposals drawn from the administration’s Maritime Action Plan. It expands the Federal Ship Financing Program to cover vessel retrofitting and updates key definitions used to evaluate financing applications, opening the door to first-time eligibility for certain fishing vessels. It also increases funding for maritime innovation programs and adds new Buy America sourcing requirements for Coast Guard equipment procurement.

Most significantly, this amendment would create the first mandatory US-flag participation rule reaching into private commercial shipping, covering containerized cargo and roll-on/roll-off vehicles. Participation would phase in gradually, with US-content requirements rising over time, and foreign-influenced vessel owners would need an approved security agreement with US-citizen oversight to take part.

Looking Ahead

With the Senate yet to advance its own version, negotiators are expected to move directly to conference talks once Congress reconvenes in September. Given the range of issues at stake, from governance and cargo rules to shipbuilding finance and vessel security, conference is a critical opportunity to shape how these provisions are reconciled. We will continue tracking this legislation and are available to help clients evaluate its potential impact. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

Establishment of the Marine Minerals Administration

July 29, 20262 minute read

Featured Image

On July 10, 2026, the Secretary of the Department of Interior (DOI) released Secretarial Order No. 3451 (Order), which, effective immediately, established the Marine Minerals Administration (MMA),  and reunified the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) into this new bureau.  DOI’s stated purpose of this Order is to improve regulatory safety, operational efficiency, and coordination by eliminating the duplicative executive leadership, administrative operations, information technology systems, and support functions found throughout both BOEM and BSEE.  

Pursuant to the Order, among other things, all functions, personnel, assets, obligations, authorities, and responsibilities of BOEM and BSEE are combined and vested in the MMA, which is now the agency responsible for all aspects of offshore energy and mineral resource management and conservation, safety oversight, environmental enforcement, and related activities on the outer continental shelf. In addition, all existing regulations and standards applicable to BOEM and BSEE will remain in full force and effect under the authority of MMA.

The Order further provides that MMA will become operational in phases to ensure that  there will be no negative impacts on safety, permitting, inspection, enforcement, leasing, production, or environmental review operations.  During this transition period, BOEM and BSEE will retain their operational authority necessary to accomplish their respective missions. 

In accordance with the Order, MMA will be led by a Director under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary – Land and Minerals Management (MMA Director).  The Order directs the MMA Director to, within nine months of the Order,  finalize the organizational structure, establish internal lines of authority, review the distribution of personnel, and advance all required actions and administrative priorities. In addition, the MMA Director is tasked with taking steps to expand and modernize the offshore safety and inspection program and provide a report of such steps to the secretary of DOI within one year of the Order. 

Currently, the acting MMA Director is Matthew Giacona (who is also the acting director of BOEM).

For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Jana Grauberger, Kathleen Doody, and Bradford Laperouse, or visit : https://www.doi.gov/mma-reunification.

Blogs

New Bill Would Bring Opportunity-Zone-Style Tax Breaks to U.S. Shipbuilding

July 23, 20262 minute read

Featured Image

Representative Mike Kelly (R-Pa.) has introduced legislation that would create up to 100 “maritime prosperity zones” across the country, spanning coastal areas as well as sites along major rivers and the Great Lakes. Businesses and projects located within these zones, including maritime supply chain companies, workforce training programs, and advanced manufacturing operations, would become eligible for targeted economic development tax incentives.

The bill builds on a broader push from the Trump administration to rebuild the domestic maritime industry. In a proposal previously put forward by the administration, and consistent with President Trump’s 2025 address to Congress promising “special tax incentives” for the sector, the maritime zone concept borrows heavily from the Qualified Opportunity Zones program enacted as part of the 2017 tax overhaul during the president’s first term.

Rep. Kelly’s proposal would not create a freestanding incentive structure. Instead, it would layer the new maritime designations onto the existing Opportunity Zone framework, aligning the business and property eligibility rules for maritime zones with those that already apply to Opportunity Zones, and matching the tax treatment available under each.

That alignment matters because Opportunity Zones themselves were recently reshaped. The 2025 tax-and-spending package expanded the availability of favorable short-term tax treatment for investments in rural Opportunity Zones and reduced the amount investors must spend improving a property relative to its basis, the “substantial improvement” threshold, to qualify for the incentive. Under Kelly’s bill, maritime prosperity zones would generally follow suit, picking up these same taxpayer-friendly adjustments.

Although the bill is still in its early legislative stages, we will continue to monitor this legislation as it moves through Congress and will provide updates on any developments. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, John Rouchell, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

Matt Jones Discusses Well Blowout Risks and Response on AAPL’s Landman Now — Podcasting the Profession Podcast

July 20, 2026less than a minute

Featured Image

As the industry continues to navigate the complexities of operational safety, Matt breaks down the mechanics of well blowouts, explaining how these incidents occur, the significant dangers they present to personnel and the environment, and the critical steps companies must take when one occurs. The discussion also provides an essential perspective on risk mitigation and incident response protocols for landmen and operators in the field.

Liskow attorney Matt Jones was recently featured on the American Association of Professional Landmen’s (AAPL) Landman Now — Podcasting the Profession podcast. In the episode, “Well Blowouts,” Matt joins host Chad Smith to discuss the technical and legal realities surrounding well control incidents.

Listen to the full episode below.

Blogs

IRS Chief Counsel Concludes Conditional Deficit Restoration Obligation Does Not Shift Partnership Liabilities

July 14, 20262 minute read

Featured Image

In Chief Counsel Advice (CCA) 202628009, released on July 10, 2026, the Internal Revenue Service concluded that a limited partner’s conditional obligation to restore a deficit capital account does not constitute a payment obligation for purposes of Treasury Regulation § 1.752-2(b). Although Chief Counsel Advice cannot be cited as precedent, the memorandum provides important insight into the IRS’s interpretation of partnership liability allocation rules under Internal Revenue Code § 752.

The memorandum involved a limited partnership whose partnership agreement generally shielded limited partners from liability for partnership debts. The agreement permitted the general partner to require a limited partner with a deficit capital account to contribute cash to eliminate the deficit. However, if the limited partner failed to contribute, the general partner’s sole remedy was the discretionary withholding of future distributions. The agreement did not require the limited partner to restore the deficit upon liquidation and provided no additional recourse against the partner.

The IRS analyzed whether this arrangement created an economic risk of loss that would permit the partnership liability to be allocated to the limited partner under Treasury Regulation § 1.752-2. The memorandum concluded that it did not. According to the IRS, a payment obligation exists only when a partner is legally obligated to satisfy a partnership liability if the partnership cannot do so. Because the general partner could satisfy any deficit merely by withholding future distributions and the limited partner had no unconditional legal obligation to make an out-of-pocket payment, the arrangement failed to create the requisite economic risk of loss.

The IRS distinguished this arrangement from a true deficit restoration obligation, which generally requires a partner to contribute personal funds upon liquidation if the partner has a negative capital account. A discretionary right to offset future distributions, standing alone, merely reallocates partnership economics rather than imposing a genuine payment obligation on the partner. As a result, the conditional obligation could not support an allocation of recourse liabilities under § 752.

Partnerships should review partnership agreements that rely on conditional deficit restoration provisions when allocating recourse liabilities among partners. If the agreement does not impose an enforceable obligation requiring a partner to satisfy partnership liabilities with personal assets, the IRS may disregard the provision for purposes of § 752 liability allocations. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

Treasury and IRS Finalize Reporting Rules for Section 1035 Exchanges and Transfers of Life Insurance Contracts

July 8, 20262 minute read

Featured Image

The Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service have issued final regulations addressing reporting obligations for certain tax-free exchanges of life insurance contracts under Internal Revenue Code Section 1035 and transfers of life insurance contracts involving valuable consideration. The regulations are intended to improve reporting compliance following statutory changes enacted by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act and to assist taxpayers in determining the proper tax treatment of life insurance transactions. The final regulations are scheduled for publication in the Federal Register on July 9, 2026.

Section 1035 generally permits taxpayers to exchange certain insurance contracts without recognizing gain if statutory requirements are satisfied. In addition, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act significantly modified the long-standing transfer for value rules by creating reporting requirements for reportable policy sales and by limiting the traditional exclusion from income for certain death benefits. The final regulations implement these statutory provisions by establishing reporting requirements for insurers and acquirers and by clarifying the obligations of taxpayers involved in covered transactions.

Among other changes, the regulations provide guidance concerning information returns required when a life insurance contract is transferred for valuable consideration or exchanged under Section 1035 following a reportable policy sale. The rules are intended to ensure that insurers receive sufficient information to determine whether the transfer for value rules apply and to accurately report taxable amounts to policyholders and the IRS. The regulations also clarify reporting responsibilities in situations involving indirect acquisitions and certain successor transactions.

The regulations provide additional certainty by defining key terms, addressing exceptions to the reporting requirements, and coordinating the reporting framework with existing information return rules. Treasury and the IRS also adopted several revisions in response to comments received on the proposed regulations, including clarifications designed to reduce unnecessary reporting burdens while preserving the government’s ability to administer the transfer for value provisions.

Businesses involved in life insurance transactions, including insurance companies, institutional investors, and purchasers of existing life insurance policies, should review their reporting and compliance procedures before the regulations become effective. Although many Section 1035 exchanges continue to qualify for nonrecognition treatment, taxpayers should not assume that every exchange or transfer is free from additional reporting obligations. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

The Differences Between Texas and Maritime Law Wrongful Death and Survival Damages

July 2, 202611 minute read

Featured Image

This article was originally published by the Texas Association of Defense Counsel (TADC) for its 2026 Spring magazine. You can read the full version of the publication here. 

The legal remedies provided to family members who survive a person who died as the result of negligence or wrongful acts can vary and are often dependent on the circumstances surrounding the death. In Texas, the survival and wrongful death claim framework is well established and is likely more familiar, at least conceptually. But when the deceased was a seaman or died on navigable water, a different body of law may apply entirely—one with its own rules about who can recover, what they can recover, and how much. This article analyzes the differences between the wrongful death and survival damages available under Texas law and those available pursuant to federal maritime law—specifically the Jones Act, the Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”), and general maritime law.

The Texas Framework

Texas wrongful death and survival law is built on a straightforward premise: when a person is killed by the negligent or wrongful conduct of another, the law should compensate both the family members who suffered the loss and the estate of the person who died. Texas accomplishes this through two distinct causes of action that are often pursued simultaneously.

The Texas Wrongful Death Act creates a cause of action whenever a death is caused by a “wrongful act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default.”1 Importantly, the claim must derive from whatever personal injury claim the deceased could have brought had they survived. If the deceased would not have had a viable claim2 against the defendant while alive, there is no viable wrongful death claim. Texas does not provide a common law right to a wrongful death claim; it is purely statutory.3

Recovery under the Texas Wrongful Death Act is limited to three categories of people: the surviving spouse, children, and parents of the deceased.4 Siblings, grandchildren, and other relatives—no matter how close the relationship—are not included. Any one or more of the eligible beneficiaries may file suit, but the suit must be brought for the benefit of all eligible claimants. If none of the eligible individuals files within three calendar months of the death, the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate may—and in most cases must—bring the action on their behalf.5

Texas wrongful death damages fall into two broad categories: economic losses and non-economic losses. Economic damages are designed to compensate the statutory beneficiaries for tangible, measurable losses, including:6

  • Loss of financial support the deceased would have provided over the course of their lifetime;
  • Loss of household services, such as childcare, home maintenance, and other contributions that must now be replaced;
  • Loss of advice, counsel, guidance, and practical support;
  • Costs incurred by surviving family members as a direct result of the death, such as mental health treatment; and
  • Loss of inheritance—the present value of what the deceased would likely have accumulated and left to the statutory beneficiaries had they lived a natural lifespan.

Non-economic damages—often the most significant component of a wrongful death award—compensate for losses that cannot be reduced to a dollar figure, including:7

  • Mental anguish: the emotional pain, torment, and suffering experienced by the survivors as a result of the death; and
  • Loss of companionship and society, meaning the positive benefits of love, comfort, and closeness that the beneficiaries have lost.

Non-economic damages are often awarded per survivor, and jurors can be given considerable discretion in valuing them. The circumstances of the death, the nature of the relationship, and the documented impact on each surviving family member can all play a significant role in the jury’s assessment.

Texas law permits punitive damages in wrongful death cases where the defendant’s conduct was grossly negligent, malicious, or fraudulent. The standard of proof is “clear and convincing evidence”—higher than the preponderance standard that would apply to other elements of the case.8 In Texas, punitive damages may not exceed the greater of: (1) two times economic damages plus an amount equal to non-economic damages found by the jury, not to exceed $750,000; or (2) $200,000.

Separate from the wrongful death claim, Texas law also allows a survival action.9 Where a wrongful death claim compensates the surviving family members for their own losses, a survival action compensates the estate for what the deceased suffered and lost before death. The distinction is important; these are different injuries belonging to different parties. Damages available in a Texas survival action include:

  • Physical pain and suffering endured between the time of injury and death;
  • Mental anguish experienced by the deceased before death;
  • Medical expenses incurred as a result of the injury;
  • Funeral and burial expenses; and
  • Lost earnings from the time of injury to the time of death.

The strength of a survival claim can be determined by what the deceased experienced before they died. If death was instantaneous or if the deceased was never conscious following the injury, pain and suffering damages would be minimal. If the deceased regained consciousness, experienced the incident, or lingered for any period, the potential award could increase significantly.

The Maritime Framework

Maritime law operates under a distinct set of rules that often reflect its history of balancing the interests of seafarers against those of ship owners and employers. The maritime framework is not a single law. In this instance, three particular sources are relevant: the Jones Act (a federal statute protecting seamen), the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA, another federal statute applying to deaths occurring outside of U.S. territorial waters), and general maritime law (a body of common law).

Who Is a “Seaman” and Why It Matters.

The most important threshold question is whether the deceased was a “seaman.” Generally speaking, a seaman works as a crew member aboard a vessel that is in navigation—contributing to the vessel’s function and spending a substantial portion of their time working on the water. Longshoremen, harbor workers, and shoreside employees typically do not qualify as seamen.

This matters because the Jones Act—which provides the most robust set of remedies for maritime workers—applies only to seamen. Workers who are not seamen may still have claims under maritime law, but the remedies and damage caps may be different.

The Jones Act.

The Jones Act, enacted by Congress in 1920, gives seamen (and, if the seaman dies, the seaman’s personal representative) the right to sue their employer or the vessel owner for negligence.10 It is modeled on the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) the law that governs railroad worker injury claims, and it incorporates FELA’s structure—including its wrongful death and survival provisions—almost entirely.11

A very important and practical consequence of this structure is that the Jones Act preempts state wrongful death statutes for seamen (hence the topic of this article). A seaman’s family cannot bring a Texas Wrongful Death Act claim against the seaman’s employer. Instead, the family’s remedies come from maritime law.

Under the Jones Act, only the court-appointed personal representative of the deceased seaman may file the wrongful death claim.12 The personal representative acts as a trustee for the designated beneficiaries; the personal representative does not bring the claim for the estate itself, but only for the benefit of the beneficiaries identified in the statute. Any award recovered under the Jones Act does not pass through the deceased’s estate.13 It goes directly to the designated beneficiaries and is not subject to the deceased’s debts or distributed under inheritance law.

The beneficiary structure under the Jones Act is hierarchical. The tiers, in order of priority, are:

  • First, the surviving spouse and children of the deceased seaman;
  • Second, the parents of the deceased (only if there is no surviving spouse or children); and
  • Third, dependent next of kin (only if there is no surviving spouse, children, or parents).

For example, a parent whose child was a Jones Act seaman can only recover under the Jones Act if the seaman left behind no spouse and no children.14 If the seaman left behind even one child, the parents are entirely cut out of the Jones Act claim—regardless of how close the relationship was or how much financial support the parent may have received from the seaman.

Damages Available Under the Jones Act.

The Jones Act limits wrongful death damages exclusively to pecuniary losses—economic harms that can be measured in dollars. Specifically, pecuniary damages under the Jones Act include loss of financial support the seaman would have provided to the beneficiaries; loss of household services, including the value of parental nurture and guidance for minor children; and funeral expenses. Non-pecuniary damages, including loss of society, loss of companionship, and loss of consortium, are not available. Additionally, the Jones Act does not allow damages for mental anguish or loss of companionship of surviving family members.

Like Texas law, the Jones Act also provides a survival action—a claim for what the seaman suffered and lost before death.15 Survival damages under the Jones Act include lost wages, (earned and unearned) at the time of death and conscious pain and suffering the seaman experienced before dying. As with Texas survival claims, the key question is whether the deceased was conscious and experienced the injury before dying. A seaman who died instantly or never regained consciousness will generate minimal survival damages. However, a seaman who was aware of their injuries and suffered presents a much stronger survival case.

The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).

The Death on the High Seas Act was enacted in 1920, the same year as the Jones Act, and applies specifically to deaths that occur on the high seas—meaning more than three nautical miles from the U.S. coastline.16 If a seaman or any other person dies in waters beyond that boundary, DOHSA provides the wrongful death remedy. DOHSA applies only to wrongful death claims. It does not create a survival action, and it is not limited to seamen, unlike the Jones Act. Anyone who dies on the high seas may be covered, including a crew member, a passenger, or a recreational boater.

DOHSA provides a cause of action for the exclusive benefit of the deceased’s spouse, parent, child, or dependent relative.17 Importantly, parents are listed directly—without any requirement that they prove financial dependency on the deceased. Dependency is required only for more distant relatives, who fall into the “dependent relative” category.

Like the Jones Act, DOHSA limits recovery to pecuniary losses only. Courts have consistently held that non-pecuniary damages—loss of companionship, loss of society, and emotional distress of survivors—are not available under DOHSA. The permitted damages are the measurable financial losses that the beneficiaries suffered as a result of the death: lost support, lost services, and funeral expenses, same as the Jones Act.

General Maritime Law.

General maritime law is best thought of as a body of common law. For most of American history, general maritime law provided no cause of action for wrongful death. That changed in 1970, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. that general maritime law does recognize a wrongful death remedy, and that a wrongful death cause of action was needed to eliminate the anomaly of allowing recovery for non-fatal injuries but not for deaths.18

General maritime law is relevant in cases where the Jones Act alone does not provide a complete remedy. A seaman’s estate might bring a general maritime wrongful death or survival claim if the death was caused by an unseaworthy vessel (a separate theory of liability from negligence) or if the defendant is someone other than the seaman’s employer. Non-seamen who die in territorial waters—close to shore but not covered by DOHSA—may also rely on general maritime law.

The most significant development in general maritime wrongful death law came in 1990, when the Supreme Court decided Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.19 In that case, a mother brought a wrongful death and survival claim after her son, a Jones Act seaman, was stabbed and killed aboard a vessel. She sought, among other things, damages for loss of society. The Supreme Court held that there is no recovery for loss of society in a general maritime wrongful death action for the death of a Jones Act seaman. The reasoning was straightforward: Congress, in passing the Jones Act, chose to limit wrongful death recovery to pecuniary damages. It would be inconsistent—and constitutionally problematic—for the courts to create a broader remedy through general maritime law than Congress allowed under a parallel statute. The result was a uniform rule across the Jones Act, DOHSA, and general maritime law that wrongful death damages for seamen are limited to pecuniary losses.

This means that no matter which maritime theory applies in a case involving a Jones Act seaman, the surviving family members will not recover damages for grief, emotional pain, or the loss of a loved one’s presence in their lives. Those categories of loss are simply not compensable under federal maritime law for deceased seamen.

General maritime law does recognize a survival action, and it is available in cases where the Jones Act alone is insufficient—for example, when a seaman’s death results from an unseaworthy vessel or from the negligence of a third party who is not the employer. Survival damages under general maritime law follow the Jones Act and provide damages for pre-death conscious pain and suffering, and lost wages.

If the person who died was not a seaman—a harbor worker or longshoreman—and the death occurred in territorial waters (within three nautical miles of shore), a different damages framework may apply. In a Supreme Court decision (Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 1974), prior to Miles, loss-of-society damages were permitted in general maritime wrongful death claims for non-seaman who died in territorial waters.20 Miles narrowed that holding, but the remedy remains available in certain non-seaman cases. This distinction is subtle but consequential for cases involving workers who were not crew members and died within U.S. territorial waters.

Texas Law v. Maritime Law

The following comparison highlights the key distinctions.

Who Can Recover?

Under Texas law, the eligible beneficiaries are the surviving spouse, children, and parents—all three groups simultaneously, without any hierarchy. A parent does not have to establish that no surviving spouse or children exist before pursuing their claim.

Under the Jones Act and DOHSA, the structure is more rigid. The Jones Act uses a hierarchical system: if a surviving spouse or children survive the deceased, parents receive nothing under the Jones Act. DOHSA lists parents among the eligible beneficiaries, but again, recovery is limited to pecuniary losses.

The parent of a Jones Act seaman who is survived by a spouse or child cannot be the beneficiary of the Jones Act wrongful death claim. A parent in that situation could pursue a general maritime law claim, but even then, the damages are limited to pecuniary losses, and the parent must demonstrate actual financial dependence on the deceased to recover.

Wrongful Death Non-Economic Damages.

Texas law allows full non-economic damages in wrongful death cases: mental anguish, grief, loss of companionship, loss of society. Under maritime law, however, the rule is uniform that non-pecuniary damages are not available for Jones Act seamen, regardless of whether the claim is brought under the Jones Act, DOHSA, or general maritime law.

In practical terms, this means that the non-economic damages that often drive large verdicts in Texas wrongful death cases are simply not available in a Jones Act seaman case, and generally for most wrongful death claims brought under maritime law. Instead, the damages case becomes built on expert testimony about future earnings, support, and household services.

Texas law allows punitive damages for gross negligence, subject to the caps described above. The maritime framework, however, is more complicated. Under the Jones Act, DOHSA and general maritime law, punitive damages have historically been unavailable in wrongful death cases—the courts have generally held that the pecuniary limitation on damages prevents punitive awards. As a general matter, beneficiaries pursuing a Jones Act wrongful death claim should not count on or even plead punitive damages.

Survival Damages.

Both Texas and maritime law recognize survival claims and the categories of damages overlap significantly—pre-death pain and suffering, and lost earnings from the time of injury to death. The strength of a survival claim under either system depends heavily on the facts of the death. If the deceased was rendered immediately unconscious and died quickly, survival damages will be limited. Medical and funeral expenses are recoverable under both systems.

A notable difference is that Texas law expressly permits recovery for loss of enjoyment of life, which could provide an additional measure of recovery.

The Role of the Personal Representative.

Under Texas law, the surviving spouse, children, and parents can each bring their own wrongful death claim, or one may sue on behalf of all. Under the Jones Act, only the personal representative of the estate may bring the wrongful death claim, and the representative acts as a trustee for the beneficiaries—not for the estate itself. Individual beneficiaries do not have standing to sue; they must proceed through the representative. Settlement authority also rests exclusively with the representative, with only narrow exceptions where a beneficiary may act independently.21

When a death occurs in or around navigable waters, state wrongful death statutes are likely preempted, and the framework of maritime law will dictate the claims, beneficiaries, and available damages. For those navigating a maritime death claim, it is important to keep the differences discussed in mind.

1 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 71.001 et. seq.
2 Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1992).
3 Castillo v. Hidalgo County Water District No. 1, 771 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989).
4 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 71.004.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Halliburton Company v. Olivas, 517 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1974, no writ); see also Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex.1986).
7 Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex.1986).
8 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 921–922 (Tex. 1998); THI of Texas at Lubbock I, LLC v. Perea, 329 S.W.3d 548, 581 (2010).
9 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 71.031.
10 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
11 45 U.S.C. § 51.
12 See Hassan v. A.M. Landry & Son, Inc., 321 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1963).
13 See Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Friedman v. McHugh, 168 F.2d 350 (1st Cir. 1948); Rowston v. Oglebay Norton Co., 180 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
14 Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling Co., 770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985); see also In re American River Trans. Co., 490 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2007).
15 Rohan for Rohan v. Exxon Corp., 896 F. Supp. 666 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
16 46 U.S.C. § 30302.
17 MacLay v. M/V SAHARA, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
18 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
19 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
20 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
21 Benoit v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 355 So.2d 892 (La.
1978).

Blogs

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Page 1
  • Page 2
  • Page 3
  • Page 4
  • Page 5
  • Page 6
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 188
  • Go to Next Page »

Primary Sidebar

Recent Posts

  • IRS Permits Entity Classification Change Following Significant Ownership Change
  • A Spirited Debate: Supreme Court to Review Federal Ban on Home Distilling
  • “Credit or Debit?”: IRS Issued Final Regulations Simplifying Tax Payments by Credit or Debit Card
  • Considering an ESOP? New Law Reduces Valuation Risk
  • EPA Finalizes Rule Clarifying “Applicable Requirements” Under Title V Program

Categories

  • Blogs
  • Events
  • Insights
  • News
Liskow & Lewis, APLC
Arrow Icon

future-focused

  • Baton Rouge
  • Houston
  • Lafayette
  • New Orleans
  • New York City
  • New Bedford
  • © 2026 Liskow & Lewis, APLC
  • Sitemap
  • Disclaimer
  • Employee Login
Site by
We use cookies on our website to give you the most relevant experience by remembering your preferences and repeat visits. By clicking “Accept All”, you consent to the use of ALL the cookies. However, you may visit "Cookie Settings" to provide a controlled consent.
Cookie SettingsAccept All
Manage consent

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may affect your browsing experience.
Necessary
Always Enabled
Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. These cookies ensure basic functionalities and security features of the website, anonymously.
CookieDurationDescription
cookielawinfo-checkbox-analytics11 monthsThis cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Analytics".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-functional11 monthsThe cookie is set by GDPR cookie consent to record the user consent for the cookies in the category "Functional".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-necessary11 monthsThis cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookies is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Necessary".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-others11 monthsThis cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Other.
cookielawinfo-checkbox-performance11 monthsThis cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Performance".
viewed_cookie_policy11 monthsThe cookie is set by the GDPR Cookie Consent plugin and is used to store whether or not user has consented to the use of cookies. It does not store any personal data.
Functional
Functional cookies help to perform certain functionalities like sharing the content of the website on social media platforms, collect feedbacks, and other third-party features.
Performance
Performance cookies are used to understand and analyze the key performance indexes of the website which helps in delivering a better user experience for the visitors.
Analytics
Analytical cookies are used to understand how visitors interact with the website. These cookies help provide information on metrics the number of visitors, bounce rate, traffic source, etc.
Advertisement
Advertisement cookies are used to provide visitors with relevant ads and marketing campaigns. These cookies track visitors across websites and collect information to provide customized ads.
Others
Other uncategorized cookies are those that are being analyzed and have not been classified into a category as yet.
SAVE & ACCEPT
  • Team
  • Practices
  • Insights
  • Blogs
  • Offices
  • Pro Bono
  • About Us
  • Careers
  • DEI
  • The Energy Law Blog
  • Gulf Coast Business Law Blog
  • The Maritime Law Blog