future-focused

Louisiana Supreme Court Rejects Appealability of Partial Summary Judgment Finding a Party Legally Responsible for Environmental Damage in Oilfield Remediation Suit

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In WMH Farms, LLC v. Apache Corporation (of Delaware), et al., the trial court granted a plaintiff landowner’s motion for summary judgment, finding that environmental damage existed on the plaintiff’s property for which defendant, JP Oil, was legally responsible.[1] JP Oil appealed, and over the plaintiff’s objection, the Third Circuit found the appeal procedurally proper and reversed the trial court’s judgment.  The Louisiana Supreme Court then granted the plaintiff’s writ application to address whether such a partial summary judgment in a remediation action under La. R.S. 30:29 (“Act 312”) is immediately appealable.  In a per curiam opinion, the Court held it was not.  Instead, the only available avenue for interlocutory appellate review of a summary judgment finding the existence of environmental damage and a legally responsible party is via a timely supervisory writ application. 

Act 312 establishes procedures for evaluating claims for environmental damage to immovable property, including the implementation of a plan to remediate such environmental damage (if found). Pursuant to Act 312, once environmental damage and a legally responsible party are found, the parties must submit proposed evaluation and/or remediation plans to the Department of Conservation and Energy (the “Department”). The Department is then charged with determining whether a proposed plan satisfies all statutory requirements. If the Department approves a plan, it must be filed with the court for consideration. Act 312 expressly provides: “Any judgment adopting a plan of evaluation or remediation … and ordering the party or parties…found legally responsible by the court to deposit funds from the implementation thereof into the registry of the court pursuant to this Section shall be considered a final judgment pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure Article 2081 et seq., for purposes of appeal.” La. R.S. 30:29(C)(6)(a).

Appellate jurisdiction extends only to final judgments. In this case, because the summary judgment resolved only some of the issues between the parties (i.e., that environmental damage existed and that defendant, JP Oil, was legally responsible), the Court held that it was only a partial final judgment.  Partial final judgments are immediately appealable only if authorized by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1915(A) (which did not apply) or at the time, if the judgment was certified under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1915(B) (which it was not).

Thus, the Court found that the Third Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction, and the only avenue for interlocutory appellate review of a judgment finding environmental damage and a legally responsible party is through a timely filed application for supervisory review.

For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Kathryn Gonski and Hayley Landry.
 

[1] WMH Farms, LLC v. Apache Corp., 2026-00223 (La. 5/19/26)

Reminder Alert – Louisiana State Inventory Tax Credit No Longer Available to C corporations for Taxes Paid on or After July 1, 2026

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Taxpayers taxed as C corporations for federal income tax purposes, and estates and trusts subject to tax levied in R.S. 47:300.1 are prohibited from earning the inventory tax credit (ITC) against state taxes for ad valorem taxes paid on or after July 1, 2026. 

ITCs earned by such taxpayers between January 1, 2025, through June 30, 2026 are not refundable, but the unused portion of the credit may be carried forward for up to 10 years. The elimination of the ITC for C Corporations will have deleterious effects on their cash-flows. 

Louisiana voters’ rejection on Saturday of the constitutional amendment that would have allowed local governments the ability to eliminate the inventory tax in their parish or to lessen the inventory tax underscores the need for C corporations to review their entity structure and tax timing strategies before the cutoff.

In addition to timing ad valorem tax payments to maximize the use of carryforwards before the phase-out, C-corporations might consider converting to an S-corporation or pass-through entity to retain eligibility for the ITC.  Such taxpayers might also evaluate other state or federal tax incentives that could offset inventory-related costs. Other entity structures may be available as well.

While there is no one-size fits all solution for taxpayers to mitigate the consequences of the inventory tax in light of the loss of the credit, affected taxpayers should seriously consider planning opportunities that may be available to them.   

For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Bob Angelico, Leon Rittenberg, III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page. 

EPA Clarifies Allowable Construction Without an NSR Permit

3 minute read

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On May 13, 2026, EPA published a proposed rule that would revise the New Source Review (NSR) air permitting regulations by clarifying that an owner or operator is not required to obtain an NSR permit to begin construction of the non-emitting components or structures of a proposed project. This proposed rule formalizes a return to a 2020 draft interpretation of the NSR regulations that was previewed in a September 2025 EPA letter to an Arizona permitting authority, wherein the EPA hinted at NSR changes with its interpretation of “begin actual construction.” If finalized, industry representatives say the rule will improve clarity in the Clean Air Act’s New NSR preconstruction permitting process, including Liskow attorney Greg Johnson, who recently spoke with Manufacturing Dive about the proposed revisions.

Some site preparation activities such as site-clearing and grading have always been allowed before obtaining an NSR permit. However, the EPA’s current definition for “begin actual construction” in the NSR regulations prohibits certain permanent on-site construction activities involving an emissions unit, including “the installation of building supports and foundations, laying underground pipework, and the construction of permanent storage structures.” Under the proposed rule, EPA would eliminate certain restrictions to allow construction of non-emitting project components before obtaining an NSR permit. To accomplish this, EPA is proposing to revise the current definition of “begin actual construction” and add a new definition of “pollutant-emitting activities” to identify which on-site construction activities stationary source owners and operators may lawfully undertake before obtaining an NSR permit.

“Begin Actual Construction”

EPA is proposing to define “begin actual construction” as the “initiation of physical on-site construction of pollutant-emitting activities on a stationary source.” This definition includes a non-exhaustive list of activities that fall outside its scope: 

  • engineering and design planning;
  • geotechnical investigation (surface and subsurface explorations);
  • clearing vegetation, grading, surveying, soil compacting and stabilization (including associated pile driving), and excavating land (including blasting or other removal of hardrock);
  • ordering of equipment and materials;
  • storing of equipment or setting up temporary trailers to house construction management or staff and contractor personnel; and
  • paving surfaces.

“Pollutant-Emitting Activities”

EPA is proposing to define “pollutant-emitting activities,” which would require the issuance of an NSR permit for construction to begin, to “include any equipment or component in a process or operation that emits or has the potential to emit a regulated NSR pollutant.” This definition does not include the following non-exhaustive list:

  • office buildings;
  • retail stores;
  • buildings or structures designed for storage of materials not capable of producing airborne vapors or particles;
  • concrete pads and building foundations, walls, and roofs that are not closed in on the interior side and do not have design elements configured to serve or support any equipment or process component that emits or may emit a regulated NSR pollutant;
  • equipment or components whose sole purpose is heating ventilation and air conditioning for human workspaces or spaces within a building used to store supplies related to the habitation of the building;
  • wiring, piping, and associated support structures that supply utility services to a property site or a building on a site; and
  • sealed junctions or tie-ins within one process that may serve equipment or components in another process constructed at a later time.

Acceleration of Construction “At Their Own Risk”

While the proposed rule would speed up construction of certain elements of proposed projects, construction of those non-emitting components or structures would still be at the risk of the project proponent. As EPA puts it, this means that “the owner or operator assumes the risk that it will not realize a return on its investment in pre-permit construction of components or structures that do not emit air pollution if a permit application is ultimately denied or an issued permit requires additional construction to reduce air pollutant emissions.” In other words, EPA is emphasizing that investment in early construction activities will not ”alter or influence” ultimate permit decisions.

Comments on the proposed rule are due by June 29, 2026.

For further information on air permitting requirements for construction, please contact Greg Johnson, Clare Bienvenu, Emily von Qualen, or Colin North.

The EPA's goal is to more clearly allow entities that plan to build or modify stationary sources of air pollution to engage in construction of non-emitting components (e.g., infrastructure to provide utility service to a site, concrete pads, foundations and other parts of buildings that are not specifically configured for emitting equipment, and office buildings) at their own risk, without altering requirements to control air pollutant emissions from the stationary sources of air pollution that these owners or operators must obtain an NSR permit to construct.

www.federalregister.gov/…

IRS Finalizes Rules Easing Reporting Burden for Partnership Interest Sales

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On May 20, 2026, the IRS issued final regulations under Treasury Decision 10048 that permanently resolve a compliance problem that has persisted since 2020. The regulations eliminate an accelerated reporting deadline that required partnerships to furnish detailed gain and loss information to selling partners by January 31 of the year following a sale of a partnership interest, a deadline that many saw as impossible to meet in practice. Under the new rules, that information must instead be provided on or with the selling partner’s Schedule K-1 for the year of the exchange, aligning the deadline with the partnership’s normal year-end tax compliance cycle.

The reporting framework at issue is governed by IRC Section 6050K, which requires a partnership to file Form 8308, Report of a Sale or Exchange of Certain Partnership Interests, with its annual Form 1065 whenever a sale involving Section 751 assets occurs. Section 751 of the Code requires that any portion of the proceeds from the sale of a partnership interest that is attributable to the partnership’s unrealized receivables and inventory items be treated as ordinary income rather than capital gain. This bifurcated treatment ensures that assets which would produce ordinary income if sold directly by the partnership do not escape that character simply because they are transferred indirectly through a sale of the partnership interest itself. To implement these rules, Section 6050K(b) requires the partnership to furnish a statement to both the transferor and transferee containing the information reported on Form 8308.

The compliance difficulty arose from a 2020 revision to Form 8308 that added a new Part IV, which required the partnership to calculate and report the transferor partner’s specific share of gain or loss from a hypothetical deemed sale of the partnership’s Section 751 property. Final regulations issued that year, under Treasury Decision 9926, required partnerships to furnish this complex Part IV information to the selling partner by the existing January 31 deadline. Partnerships and their advisors responded with sustained objections, explaining that the calculations required for Part IV simply cannot be completed accurately until the partnership’s books have been closed for the year and all year-end accounting, allocation, and valuation work has been finalized. Acknowledging these concerns, the IRS provided temporary penalty relief for exchanges occurring in 2023 and 2024 through Notice 2024-19 and Notice 2025-2, but those measures addressed the symptom rather than the underlying regulatory problem.

The final regulations address the problem at its source by removing the provision of the prior regulations, specifically Regulation Section 1.6050K-1(c)(2), that created the accelerated furnishing requirement for Part IV. By eliminating that paragraph, the regulations decouple the Part IV information from the January 31 date entirely. Partnerships are now required to provide the detailed Section 751 gain and loss information necessary for the selling partner to calculate the ordinary income portion of the sale at the same time, and under the same deadline, as the partner’s Schedule K-1 for the year of the exchange. The final regulations adopt the proposed regulations issued in August 2025 without substantive change, as no public comments were received and no public hearing was requested on the proposed rules.

Several important reporting obligations remain unchanged. Partnerships must still furnish a statement to both the transferor and transferee partners containing the information in Parts I, II, and III of Form 8308, which includes the names, addresses, taxpayer identification numbers, and the date of the exchange. That statement is due by the later of January 31 of the year following the exchange or thirty days after the partnership receives notice of the exchange. The partnership’s obligation to file a complete Form 8308, including the Part IV calculations, with its annual Form 1065 return also remains fully in effect. The relief provided by the final regulations is precisely targeted at the deadline for furnishing the Part IV data to the selling partner and does not affect the filing obligation.

The new rules apply to returns filed for tax years ending on or after May 20, 2026. However, the regulations also provide that partnerships may elect to rely on the new rules for any exchanges that occurred on or after January 1, 2025, but before the official publication date of the final regulations. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page. 

Update – Navigating Liability: The Future of Interstate Broker Regulation

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Last October, our team highlighted the tension between the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (the “Act”), and state-based negligence hiring claims against transportation brokers. To recap, the Act broadly preempts state laws “related to the prices, routes, and services of the trucking industry.” Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, No. 24-1238, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 14, 2026). But it has a critical carveout: States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. It was an open question whether this carveout permitted state-based negligent hiring claims against freight brokers—that is, “the transportation industry’s matchmakers,” who “connect[] sellers of goods to the carriers who move them.” Id. After Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, now we know, “It does.” Id. 

By unanimous agreement in Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that the Act does not preempt state-law negligent hiring claims. Writing for the Court, Justice Barrett’s analysis proceeded with a basic observation on the nature of state “police power,” emphasizing that tort law is not merely remedial but regulatory: “common-law duties and standards of care form part of a State’s authority to regulate safety.” Id. at 4. As a result, negligent-hiring claims, which “impose a duty of reasonable care in employing a contractor for work carrying a risk of physical harm,” operate as a form of state safety regulation. Id. at 5. This understanding is critical because it brings traditional negligence law within the scope of the statutory exception. 

From there, the dispute “boil[ed] down to whether” such claims against brokers are those “with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. The Court resolved this issue through ordinary-meaning textualism. Because the statute does not define the phrase, the Court gave it its everyday meaning, explaining that “with respect to” means “referring to,” “concerning,” or “regarding.” Id. Merging the definition with the statutory definition of “motor vehicle,” the Court concluded that a claim falls within the exception if it “‘regards’ vehicles used in transportation.” Id.

Applying that framework, the result was “straightforward.” Id. A negligent-hiring claim against a broker concerns motor vehicles because it targets the selection of the trucks and carriers that will perform the transportation. Thus, requiring a broker to exercise reasonable care in choosing a carrier “‘concerns’ motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods.” Id. at 6. On that basis, the claim falls within the safety exception, which “saves it from preemption.” Id. at 6. 

In reaching its holding, the Court rejected arguments that such reading would “swallow” the statute’s preemption clause, clarifying that “the safety exception saves only a subset of preempted claims: those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety.” Id. (citing 49 U. S. C.§14501(c)(2)(A)). In other words, purely economic regulations, like “motor carrier prices, routes, and services” remain preempted. Id.  The Court also rejected Respondents’ invitation to narrow the safety exception based on an anomaly within the statute. Respondents argued that reading the exception to cover brokers would create inconsistencies with another section of the statute related to “intrastate” transportation that lacked a similar safety exception. But the Court declined to “rewrite the text” to eliminate those tensions, concluding that even if the statutory scheme is confounding, “the text of subsection (c)(2)(A) controls.” Id. at 7. After all, in the Court’s view, it was “[b]etter to live with the mystery than to rewrite the statute.” Id.

In short, the Court preserved state-law negligence claims against brokers who select unsafe carriers, and brokers will now face real consequences of this new reality. Indeed, following Montgomery, brokers are now exposed to varying state-law standards, exacerbating a patchwork-compliance burden.  

Complicating matters further, the Montgomery holding may have implications that are not yet fully understood. Though Montgomery involved brokers who coordinate interstate trucking, it remains unclear whether the decision will affect other transportation intermediaries, such as freight forwarders, operating in different commercial contexts. Modern maritime shipping, for example, is deeply intertwined with inland transportation logistics. As the Supreme Court has once observed, maritime commerce “is often inseparable from some land-based obligations,” especially in light of the fact that “[t]he international transportation industry clearly has moved into a new era—the age of multimodalism, door-to-door transport based on efficient use of all available modes of transportation by air, water, and land.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 25 (2004). 

It is likewise uncertain what effect, if any, Montgomery will have on broker liability in cases involving claims other than personal injury, including cargo loss or damage. Given that state law claims for negligent hiring are no longer categorically preempted, brokers may face potential exposure where cargo damage arises from roadway accidents involving motor carriers they selected. However, in cases involving theft (including increasingly sophisticated cargo theft schemes) or other non-accident losses, it remains unclear whether the statutory “safety” exception would apply, meaning brokers may still retain a viable preemption defense. Overall, it appears that while the Court struck down one theory of preemption in Montgomery, the broader game of legal whack-a-mole appears to have only just begun. 

For more information, contact Liskow attorneys Kathryn Gonski, Will Yost, and Chace Vienne.

 

Why Trial Lawyers Still Matter in the Age of AI

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After more than twenty years in the courtroom, I have learned that efficiency affects how cases are prepared and managed, but it does not determine the outcome. That is especially true now, as the tools available to lawyers continue to evolve.

Lawyers today utilize technology that would have been unimaginable when I first started practicing. AI can move through enormous volumes of discovery in minutes, analyze past results, and suggest how certain arguments might play in a particular venue. Used thoughtfully, these tools can help reduce inefficiencies without replacing the attorney’s role in decision-making. While AI has enhanced efficiency in law, the moments that actually decide a case still remain live in the courtroom. They happen when a witness pauses before answering a hard question, in the way a witness responds when pressed, or in the instant a jury begins to recognize a story as something that makes sense to them. Those moments can’t be automated. They still depend on human judgment, presence, and the ability to respond to what is unfolding in the room. Knowing when to advance an issue, when to step back, and when it makes sense to rethink the strategy altogether are critical parts of effective legal judgment.

Data Is Not Judgment

AI is very good at spotting patterns and flagging risks. It can tell you what has happened before and what the numbers suggest might happen again. But it cannot determine how to proceed when a case no longer follows those patterns.

Trials are unpredictable. They are shaped by people—judges, jurors, and witnesses—each bringing individual perspectives into the courtroom. The right decision isn’t always the cleanest or most efficient one on paper. Often, it’s the decision that fits the moment, the audience, and the dynamics you are actually facing rather than one generated by algorithms.

Situational Awareness Remains Critical

No software can tell when a witness is starting to lose credibility, when jurors are drifting, or when an argument that looked solid in preparation just isn’t landing.

Trial lawyers are always watching and listening—tone, posture, pacing, reactions. We make adjustments in the moment, let go of arguments that aren’t helping, and press when credibility begins to wear thin. That kind of judgment isn’t learned from data. It comes from experience and the responsibility of standing up in court and making the call.

Effective litigators don’t shy away from technology. They use it to cut through inefficiencies and focus their attention on what matters—judgment, credibility, storytelling, and making decisions when the pressure is real.

By the time a case reaches a judge or a jury, most of the analytical work is already done. What remains is advocacy: presenting the law and the facts in a way that is credible, fair, and responsive to the people in the room.

AI will continue to shape how legal work is done. That evolution is inevitable. What it does not change is the role trial lawyers play when the outcome of a case is on the line.

The real question isn’t whether to use these tools, but how to use them wisely. 

Using AI Wisely

  • Let AI handle volume, not judgment. Use it for discovery review, research, and pattern recognition—not for deciding strategy or making calls that require experience.
  • Treat AI as a second set of eyes. Its outputs are prompts to think, not conclusions to follow. Always apply your own context and judgment.
  • Use AI to strengthen your story, not replace it. Stress-test themes and anticipate counterarguments, and then refine the narrative to resonate with real people.
  • Verify everything. Double-check research, citations, and summaries. Credibility lost to AI error is hard to recover.
  • Save your energy for what matters most. Let technology reduce inefficiencies so you can concentrate on witnesses, advocacy, and decisions made under pressure.

When used wisely, AI assists the process, but trial work is ultimately shaped by lawyers making the calls when it matters most. 

 

No software can tell when a witness is starting to lose credibility, when jurors are drifting, or when an argument that looked solid in preparation just isn’t landing.

Streamlined Extension Process Now Available for Employers Facing ERC Claim Disallowance Deadlines

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On April 27th, the IRS announced a method for certain taxpayers to request  additional time to pursue an administrative appeal when the IRS has disallowed its COVID-era Employee Retention Credit (ERC) claim before they must file suit.  (IR-2026-58).

When the IRS disallows an ERC claim, it issues Letter 105‑C or 106‑C, triggering a two‑year period for the taxpayer to either resolve the issue administratively or file a refund suit in federal court. However, filing an appeal of the disallowance with the IRS Independent Office of Appeals does not suspend or extend this statutory deadline.

Employers that have six months or less remaining to file suit, and whose ERC claims remain under IRS review,  may now submit a Form 907, “Agreement to Extend the Time to Bring Suit,”  through the IRS’s  new online tool at IRS.gov/DUTReply by selecting notice CP320B from the drop-down menu. The process allows taxpayers to avoid losing refund rights while their ERC claims remain under review. The IRS will notify taxpayers in writing whether it agrees to the extension and will return countersigned forms when approved.

The IRS is issuing Notice CP320B to taxpayers it has identified as eligible, but employers may still qualify even if they do not receive the notice. More detailed instructions are available at IRS.gov/erc105c and IRS.gov/erc106c.

A properly executed Form 907, signed by both the taxpayer and the IRS before the deadline, extends the time for the IRS to complete its review and preserves the employer’s right to file suit if necessary.

Employers with disallowed ERC claims should pay attention to the date on their IRS Letter 105‑C or 106‑C. Once the two‑year period expires without a suit having been filed, the IRS cannot issue a refund, making timely action critical  to preserve the ability to recover refunds of ERC claims that are ultimately approved by the IRS.

The IRS said it will continue processing ERC claims and appeals under established procedures, adding that the new streamlined process is intended to provide taxpayers with timely information about their rights and available options.

In a blog post, National Taxpayer Advocate Erin Collins stated that “This new streamlined process for ERC claims is a step in the right direction toward protecting taxpayer rights, but it highlighted a broader issue.”  Collins went on to state that “The two-year deadline under IRC section 6532(a) is unforgiving, and too many taxpayers, practitioners, and IRS employees are unaware of its consequences until it is too late.”

For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Caroline Lafourcade, Leon Ritteneberg, III and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page. 

Employers that have six months or less remaining on their statute of limitations to file suit and are still waiting for the IRS to consider their response to a disallowance letter may now submit a Form 907, “Agreement to Extend the Time to Bring Suit,” to the IRS through a new online tool, to avoid losing refund rights while their ERC claims remain under review.

Constitutional Challenge to the FMC

3 minute read

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Since the 2020-2022 supply chain congestion, ocean carriers have faced a wave of Shipping Act claims from customers seeking to recover elevated import costs incurred during the pandemic-driven surge in U.S. consumer demand. Broadly speaking, these complaints have been brought by multinational big-box chains seeking to recover some of the steep costs they incurred to import their goods during the pandemic era’s unprecedented surge in U.S. consumer demand. A handful of these claims have progressed to initial adjudication before the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), resulting in administrative decisions with sizable damage awards against the carrier. This week, for the first time, an ocean carrier has taken square aim at the source of those decisions: the Federal Maritime Commission itself. 

On May 5, 2026, Orient Overseas Container Line Limited and its Europe and USA affiliates (collectively, OOCL) filed suit in a Texas federal court seeking a temporary restraining order and injunction against enforcement of an April 24, 2026 FMC ruling. In that ruling, Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Erin Wirth (also named as a defendant in OOCL’s new Texas lawsuit) found OOCL liable under the Shipping Act (46 U.S.C. 41102) for unreasonable practices involving service commitments, failure to perform its services in accordance with service contracts, refusal to deal, and retaliation against the complainant Bed, Bath & Beyond. In the initial decision, ALJ Wirth awarded approximately $45.6 million in reparations. 

In the May 2026 federal complaint, OOCL advances both jurisdictional and constitutional arguments. First, it frames the FMC ruling as deciding contractual disputes rather than statutory violations.  OOCL argues the FMC lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate claims regarding service and space allocation, price terms, or the reasonableness of OOCL’s demurrage and detention charges because those are breach-of-contract claims relating to the service contracts between ocean carriers and their customers. OOCL contends that the Shipping Act gives the FMC jurisdiction over statutory violations, but it does not extend jurisdiction to contract enforcement.

Second, OOCL asserts that all  FMC proceedings are unconstitutional to the extent they involve ‘executive’ function (i.e., enforcement of the Shipping Act in the form of civil reparations) rather than ‘administrative’ functions.  OOCL contends that because the FMC ALJs are insulated by two ‘for-cause’ removal layers, they are impermissibly restricted from presidential oversight. Specifically, an FMC ALJ can only be removed for good cause by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and, in turn, the MSPB members themselves can only be removed for cause. OOCL argues that this violates Article II of the constitution by restricting presidential oversight over executive branch officers. 

While there is a circuit split, this argument has been successful in obtaining preliminary injunctions against ALJ rulings from the National Labor Review Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Department of Labor in the Fifth Circuit. OOCL also contends that this constitutional argument is supported by the current Department of Justice. A 2025 memorandum from the DOJ explains, “the Department of Justice has concluded that the multiple layers of removal restrictions for … ALJs … violate the Constitution, [and] the Department will no longer defend them in court[.]” If the court adopts OOCL’s arguments, the FMC’s scope and power could be curtailed.

The lawsuit is a big swing, and a consequential one. If successful, OOCL’s challenge would impact roughly a dozen proceedings currently pending before the FMC, with claims totaling billions of dollars at stake.  Attacking the FMC and its individual ALJs is its own risk. To borrow a phrase: 

“You come at the king, you best not miss.” Omar Little, The Wire.

For more information, please contact Liskow attorneys Emily von Qualen, Chelsea Crews, and Ray Waid, and visit Liskow’s Maritime Litigation & Casualty Response and Maritime Transactions practice pages.

IRS Resumes Significant-Issue Rulings for Corporate Reorganizations and Spin-Offs

2 minute read

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The IRS announced that it will once again issue private letter rulings on “significant issues” arising in corporate reorganizations and spin-offs, reversing a 2024 policy that had curtailed such rulings. Under Revenue Procedure 2026-21, taxpayers may now request rulings on discrete legal issues within a transaction, rather than seeking a ruling on the entire structure.

This change follows the IRS’s withdrawal of proposed spin-off regulations in September 2025 and reflects a broader shift toward restoring taxpayer access to advance guidance. IRS officials have since encouraged taxpayers to utilize the ruling process, particularly in complex Section 355 spin-offs and Section 368 reorganizations.

Rev. Proc. 2026-21 permits taxpayers to request rulings on specific, “germane and discrete” issues arising in corporate transactions, provided those issues fall solely within the jurisdiction of the IRS Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Corporate). The guidance emphasizes that ruling requests must be narrowly tailored and directly relevant to the transaction, rather than broad or hypothetical in nature.

The revenue procedure does not guarantee that the IRS will issue a ruling in every case. Instead, it restores the IRS’s discretion to consider targeted ruling requests, subject to existing procedural requirements such as full disclosure, required representations, and user fees. The IRS also retains the ability to decline rulings on issues that are overly factual, uncertain, or otherwise inappropriate for advance guidance.

The reinstatement of significant-issue rulings provides taxpayers with a renewed opportunity to obtain targeted tax certainty in high-stakes corporate transactions, particularly where a single legal issue may determine overall tax treatment. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page. 

Changes Are Ablaze: China’s Revised Maritime Code Reshapes Fire Liability for Carriers

2 minute read

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On May 1, 2026, the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) implemented the most extensive revision of its Maritime Code since the Code’s enactment in 1993. For anyone trading to, from, or within China, the revisions will impact liability, dispute resolution, and more—especially for cargo carriers and claims.  

Under the prior code, Article 51(2) provided that an international carrier was exempt from liability regardless of whether the fire accident occurred at sea or on land as long as the fire accident leading to the cargo loss or damage occurred within the carrier’s period of responsibility and was not the actual fault of the carrier.  

Under the new code, shore-side terminal and warehouse fires during the carrier’s period of responsibility are no longer exempt. So, the fire exemption is now limited to on-board fires.

It is important to note that the new code creates consistency between international carriage and domestic carriage—port-to-port voyages within China (the Code remains inapplicable to transport in rivers, lakes, and other similar inland waters)—whereas the prior code applied only to international voyages. Although the code now extends to domestic carriage to create consistency, domestic carriage is excluded from being able to rely on the fire exemption. 

The differing seaworthiness obligations contained in Article 48 of the new code likely explain the domestic carriage exclusion. For international voyages, a vessel must be seaworthy before and at the commencement of a voyage, yet for domestic carriage, the carrier shall exercise due diligence for the vessel to be seaworthy throughout the entire voyage. This would create a conflict of clauses if a vessel engaged in domestic carriage, required to be seaworthy for an entire voyage, claims the fire exemption for damage that was caused by unseaworthiness.

In sum, the code revision limits the fire exemption clause to international voyages—where the port of loading or discharge is located within a PRC territory—for damage caused by fire on board the vessel. In the age of lithium-ion batteries and incorrectly disclosed cargo, this revision could have significant effects on an international carrier’s exposure.

For more information or questions on how this revision may impact you or your company’s operations, contact Liskow attorney Elizabeth Strunk and visit Liskow’s Maritime Litigation & Casualty Response practice page.