future-focused

D.C. Circuit Upholds EPA’s Designation of PFOA and PFOS as CERCLA Hazardous Substances

4 minute read

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On August 18, 2026, the D.C. Circuit handed EPA a clean win on one of the most consequential environmental rules of the decade. In Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, No. 24-1193, the court denied every petition challenging EPA’s 2024 rule designating PFOA and PFOS — two of the most common “forever chemicals” — as hazardous substances under CERCLA, the federal Superfund law. 

EPA’s designation, which is now firmly in place, carries significant implications for companies that (knowingly or unknowingly) make, use, transport, or dispose of materials containing PFOA and PFOS. Here is what the Chamber of Commerce decision says and what it means going forward.

 

What the Court Decided

In 2024, EPA designated PFOA and PFOS as CERCLA hazardous substances, relying on research linking exposure to adverse health effects, including cancer and developmental delays. The Chamber of Commerce and other industry groups petitioned to vacate the rule. They raised three challenges, and the court rejected all of them. 

  • Statutory authority. The petitioners argued EPA could designate a substance only if harm was certain to follow a release. Reviewing the statute de novo under Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), the court held EPA had the better reading: the word “may” refers to a possibility of substantial danger, not a certainty, and Congress wrote CERCLA to operate on scientific probabilities rather than absolute proof.
  • Adequate notice. The court found EPA’s final cost-benefit analysis was a “logical outgrowth” of the economic assessment it had circulated for comment – indeed, EPA expanded that analysis in direct response to industry’s own comments.
  • Reasoned decision-making. The court applied deferential “zone of reasonableness” review and upheld EPA’s cost and benefit estimates, its treatment of specific industries, and its decision to regulate despite acknowledged uncertainties. The court emphasized the deferential nature of arbitrary-and-capricious review and concluded that EPA had reasonably addressed those issues based on the information available to it.

The court also rejected petitioners’ constitutional arguments, finding no nondelegation or vagueness problem, reasoning that Congress supplied an intelligible principle tying EPA’s authority to a science-based public-health standard. 

One potentially significant question remains unanswered: whether CERCLA actually requires EPA to consider costs when deciding whether to designate a hazardous substance in the first place. EPA assumed that it did for purposes of this rule, and the D.C. Circuit likewise assumed the requirement without deciding it.

 

What the Decision Means for Industrial Companies

The immediate legal effect is straightforward: PFOA and PFOS are confirmed hazardous substances under CERCLA, and the compliance and liability machinery that comes with that status applies.

That status carries some direct regulatory consequences. Among other things, releases above the applicable one-pound reportable quantity can trigger federal reporting requirements, and shipments above specified quantities are subject to hazardous-material transportation requirements.

The potentially larger concern for industrial companies, however, is CERCLA liability. Hazardous-substance status means that PFOA and PFOS can now form the basis for CERCLA response actions and cost-recovery claims. EPA may, after additional regulatory steps, compel responsible parties to undertake cleanup, while EPA, states, and private parties may potentially seek recovery of response costs under CERCLA.

 

Practical considerations for industry

Companies with current or historical connections to PFOA or PFOS should continue evaluating where those substances may intersect with their operations – not only through their own historical use, but through their connection to products, waste streams, wastewater, and other pathways.

The Chamber of Commerce opinion is particularly relevant to businesses that have not manufactured PFAS but may have received or handled PFAS-containing materials. The petitioners specifically raised concerns about downstream industries such as waste management, construction, and recycling. EPA responded, and the court noted, that CERCLA contains statutory defenses and limitations as well as mechanisms addressing parties responsible for comparatively small contributions.

As we have previously reported, EPA has noted that, under its enforcement discretion, it intends to prioritize manufacturers of PFAS in response actions, as opposed to passive receivers of PFAS.  But companies evaluating their PFAS exposure should not assume that EPA’s current enforcement priorities eliminate potential liability – particularly because private parties and states may have independent avenues for pursuing claims.

Practical steps that companies should consider include:

  • Evaluate potential PFAS risk. In consultation with counsel to ensure privileges and confidentiality are upheld, companies with historical PFOA or PFOS use should consider whether their operations, facilities, or waste streams present material CERCLA or release-reporting issues.
  • Update transactional diligence. Purchasers and lenders should ensure that environmental due diligence appropriately considers potential PFOA/PFOS releases, particularly where a property’s historical uses involved PFAS, and evaluate with counsel and environmental professionals whether further investigation is warranted.
  • Revisit contracts and insurance. Review indemnities, representations, and environmental cost-allocation provisions in acquisition, lease, and supply agreements, and evaluate how PFAS liabilities are treated under existing coverage.
  • Preserve potential defenses. Companies should evaluate, with counsel, whether facts may support CERCLA defenses or liability limitations, including third-party, innocent-landowner, de minimis, or de micromis protections.

 

What’s Still Unsettled

The Chamber of Commerce ruling resolves the challenge to the PFOA/PFOS designation – but the broader PFAS legal landscape remains in motion. PFOA and PFOS are only two of more than 9,000 PFAS compounds, and questions remain about whether and how additional PFAS will be regulated by federal, state, and local authorities. 

Among the questions that will continue to develop are how courts apply traditional CERCLA liability, causation, divisibility, allocation, and statutory defenses to PFAS scenarios; how entities that passively received PFAS through ordinary waste or wastewater streams will fare in CERCLA disputes; and how EPA’s enforcement policies interact with private-party and state claims.

Beyond CERCLA, PFAS litigation continues to expand. The federal AFFF MDL in South Carolina includes thousands of pending claims, with personal-injury claims moving toward bellwether trials. How those cases resolve – and whether PFAS litigation expands materially beyond AFFF into claims involving industrial releases, consumer products, and other exposure pathways – remains an important trend to watch.

Finally, it is possible that the Chamber of Commerce petitioners will seek review from the U.S. Supreme Court. Because the case involves a nationally significant EPA rule with potentially substantial consequences across multiple industries, it would not be surprising to see the Court grant certiorari.

For further questions regarding PFAS and regulation of other “forever chemicals,” contact Liskow attorney Michael Mims and visit our Environmental Practice Page.

D.C. Circuit Upholds EPA’s NSR “Project Emissions Accounting” Rule, Signals Future As-Applied Challenges

3 minute read

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On July 28, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) upheld the first Trump EPA’s “project emissions accounting” rule (or the Rule), which allows air permit applicants to account for both emissions increases and decreases at the first stage of New Source Review (NSR). Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, No. 18-1149. The D.C. Circuit’s decision comes on the heels of several significant NSR developments, including EPA’s reinstatement of its “no-second guessing” policy, recission of its reactivation policy, and promulgation of its proposed rule clarifying the scope of construction activities that may proceed without obtaining an NSR permit.

EPA’s “Project Emissions Accounting” Rule

Under the Clean Air Act’s NSR program, an existing major stationary source proposing to undertake a project must determine whether such project will constitute a “major modification” subject to the major NSR preconstruction permitting requirements by following a two-step applicability test:

  • At Step One, the regulated entity and permitting authority ask whether the proposed project would, by itself, cause a “significant emissions increase” of a regulated NSR pollutant; if it would not, the project does not constitute a modification, and no major NSR permit is required.
  • If the proposed project will itself significantly increase emissions of a regulated NSR pollutant, the regulated entity and permitting authority move to Step Two and determine whether the project will also result in a “significant net emissions increase” (i.e., whether it will be offset by a source-wide emissions decrease, which must be creditable and contemporaneous with the corresponding emissions increase).

In 2020, EPA finalized the project emissions accounting rule to clarify that both increases and decreases in emissions resulting from a proposed project can be considered in Step One of the NSR major modification applicability test. 

Petitioners’ Challenge

Petitioners claimed that the Rule was contrary to law and arbitrary or capricious, in part because measuring net emissions on a project-by-project basis (as opposed to a source-wide basis) “invites entities to circumvent NSR review by bundling ‘unrelated activities’ into a single ‘project.’” That flaw, the petitioners argued, “was enabled and exacerbated, by the EPA’s decision not to import Step Two’s guardrails—namely, creditability and contemporaneity—into Step One.”

D.C. Circuit’s Decision

The D.C. Circuit ultimately rejected the petitioners’ arguments because it concluded that the Clean Air Act did not preclude EPA’s interpretation allowing project-related emissions decreases to be considered alongside increases at Step One. The D.C. Circuit did, however, note that the petitioners had identified circumstances which could preclude certain applications of the Rule. 

Prior precedent established that, when calculating net emissions increases, any emissions decrease must be “substantially contemporaneous” with the emissions increase. Because EPA’s Rule did not include a temporal boundary on the emissions decreases that may be considered, the D.C. Circuit explained that, depending on how the Rule is applied to particular projects, an application of the Rule might not satisfy the substantial contemporaneity requirement. However, the D.C. Circuit held that the project emissions accounting rule was not facially unlawful and would “reserve questions regarding the Rule’s particular applications for another day.”

This decision confirms EPA’s authority to evaluate a project’s net emission effects at the first step of the NSR applicability analysis and provides continued regulatory certainty for facilities undertaking modernization and operational improvement projects. For certain projects, the ability to account for emissions decreased alongside increases at Step One may allow facilities to avoid triggering major NSR permitting requirements. However, facilities should continue to evaluate whether emissions decreases satisfy applicable timing and creditability requirements.

For further information on air permitting requirements for construction, please contact Greg Johnson, Clare Bienvenu, Emily von Qualen, or Colin North.

The Environmental Defense Fund and several other environmental
groups have petitioned for review of a rule that alters the
Environmental Protection Agency’s process to determine
whether a stationary source of air pollution can be modified
absent a permit under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review
program. The petitioners have not persuaded us that the rule is
contrary to law. Nor have they demonstrated that it is arbitrary
or capricious. Accordingly, we deny their petitions.

media.cadc.uscourts.gov/…

IRS Proposes to Ease Form 1041-A Filing Burden for Trusts With Passthrough Charitable Deductions

3 minute read

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The Treasury Department and IRS have issued proposed regulations that would eliminate an information-return filing requirement for certain trusts whose only charitable contribution deductions flow from a partnership or S corporation in which the trust holds an interest. The proposed rule, published for public inspection under REG-109082-25 and scheduled for formal publication in the Federal Register on August 17, 2026, responds directly to complaints from practitioners that the current filing requirement imposes an unnecessary burden on trustees who may not even be aware it applies to them.

Under existing law, a trust other than a simple trust can generally deduct amounts of gross income that are, under its governing instrument, paid for a charitable purpose described in Section 170(c) of the tax code. Section 6034 requires trusts claiming this deduction, or split-interest trusts described in Section 4947(a)(2), to file an annual information return reporting details about the deduction, including amounts previously deducted but not yet paid out and a full balance sheet of trust assets and liabilities. The reporting requirement, dating back to the Revenue Act of 1950, was designed to let the IRS confirm that charitable deductions claimed for accumulated trust income are eventually actually paid to charity and are not claimed more than once.

The problem the new proposal addresses is that this same reporting obligation currently sweeps in trusts that never accumulated any charitable funds of their own at all. When a trust owns an interest in a partnership or S corporation that makes a charitable contribution, the trust picks up its allocable share of that deduction under Sections 702 or 1366 of the Code, even though the trust itself never received or held the contributed funds and made no independent decision to give to charity. Commenters argued that requiring these pass-through recipient trusts to complete the same Form 1041-A as trusts actively accumulating charitable funds serves no real enforcement purpose while creating real administrative headaches, particularly for trustees unfamiliar with the obscure filing requirement.

The proposed regulations would add a new exception under Treasury Regulation Section 1.6034-1(b), relieving a trust of the Form 1041-A filing requirement for any taxable year in which its only Section 642(c) deduction results from a passthrough contribution reported to it on a Schedule K-1. The proposal would also fix a longstanding technical inconsistency in the regulations: current rules still direct split-interest trusts described in Section 4947(a)(2) to file Form 1041-A, even though Form 5227 has actually replaced that form for such trusts since 2007 following the Pension Protection Act. The proposed regulations would formally update the text to require split-interest trusts to file Form 5227 instead.

Treasury and the IRS have designated the rule as deregulatory under Executive Order 14192 and confirmed it is not economically significant. If finalized, the changes would apply to taxable years ending on or after the date final regulations are published, though trusts and split-interest trusts may rely on the proposed rules for earlier taxable years in the meantime. Trustees and fiduciary advisors whose trusts hold interests in partnerships or S corporations with charitable giving programs should review their current Form 1041-A filing practices in light of this proposal and consider submitting comments if the change would affect their compliance obligations. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Fifth Circuit Narrows Limited Partner Tax Exemption in Revised Ruling

2 minute read

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The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has  quietly rewritten the rules for who counts as a “limited partner” exempt from self-employment tax, replacing a taxpayer-friendly January opinion with a more restrictive standard that will make the exemption harder to claim for partners who are actively involved in running their businesses.

The case, involving Houston consulting firm Sirius Solutions LLLP, centers on Section 1402(a)(13) of the tax code, which exempts a limited partner’s share of partnership income from the self-employment taxes that fund Social Security and Medicare. Sirius argued that any partner with limited liability under state law should qualify for the exemption, regardless of their actual involvement in the business. The IRS countered that only genuinely passive investors should qualify. The Tax Court sided with the IRS, but a Fifth Circuit panel reversed that decision in January, adopting a bright-line rule that a limited partner is simply “a partner in a limited partnership that has limited liability.” The formalistic test would have let almost any partner claim the exemption based on paperwork alone.

This week, the same panel withdrew that opinion and issued a new one reaching the same result for Sirius but on narrower grounds. Judges Kurt Engelhardt and Andrew Oldham now define a limited partner as “a partner who plays no significant role in managing or running a business,” a functional standard grounded in what the judges called the plain text of the statute. The court did not explain why it revised its earlier reasoning. Judge James Graves Jr., who dissented from both versions, said the new opinion “partially corrected course” but still failed to limit the exemption strictly to passive investors, as he believes the statute requires. The new opinion ties limited partner status to a partner’s actual role in the business, making it tougher for active partners to claim the exemption. 

The ruling does not settle the matter nationally. Similar cases are pending in two other federal circuits, and the underlying question, including a related Tax Court case involving Soroban Capital Partners, may eventually reach the Supreme Court. In the meantime, partnerships relying on limited partner status to avoid self-employment tax should review partners’ actual management roles, not just their titles, and watch how this evolving standard develops. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Treasury Finalizes Rollback of Corporate Transparency Act Reporting Requirements

2 minute read

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The Treasury Department permanently scaled back the beneficial ownership reporting obligations that the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) originally imposed on tens of millions of US companies. Final regulations released by Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on August 11, 2026, confirm that domestic companies will no longer need to disclose their owners’ names, addresses, and other identifying information to the government.

The final rule builds on interim guidance FinCEN issued in March 2025, which signaled that US companies were off the hook for reporting. The final regulations make that relief permanent. 

When the CTA’s reporting regime took effect in 2024, it was allegedly put in place to prevent bad actors from hiding behind anonymous shell companies to launder money, finance terrorism, and fund other illicit activity. The requirements drew sustained criticism from the business community and faced repeated legal challenges before Treasury began walking them back.  The burdens imposed upon the average citizen were overwhelming.

Importantly, the rollback is not a full repeal. Foreign companies registered to do business in the United States must still report beneficial ownership information for their foreign owners, though they are now excused from disclosing information about US “company applicants” who assisted with their US registration. FinCEN has also confirmed it will delete previously submitted beneficial ownership information for any US persons who are now exempt from reporting.

For businesses that previously registered or prepared to register under the CTA, this final rule offers welcome certainty: domestic entities generally have no further reporting obligations going forward. Foreign entities operating in the US, however, should confirm their continuing obligations under the narrowed rule. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Tax Court Rejects Reeds’ Deduction Claims Over Poor Recordkeeping and Commingled Funds

2 minute read

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On August 5, 2026, the Tax Court issued its decision in Reed v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-64, sustaining most of the IRS’s determinations against Scott L. Reed, a real estate consultant, and Dr. Stacy N. Reed, a physician, for tax years 2012 through 2015. The opinion offers a useful reminder of how far courts will go to hold taxpayers to the consequences of sloppy bookkeeping and casually structured transactions.

The Reeds ran several ventures during the years at issue, including a real estate consulting firm, three historic rehabilitation projects in Arkansas and Alabama, a private dermatology practice, and a small business selling reclaimed wood. The IRS used a bank deposit analysis to reconstruct unreported income and disallowed roughly $500,000 in claimed deductions, leading to a notice of deficiency and penalties.

Mr. Reed had used personal funds to cover expenses for his consulting firm’s development projects and then deducted those amounts as business expenses, unreimbursed partnership expenses, or bad debts. The court rejected all three theories. Because the entities had recorded the transfers as loans, some of which were later repaid, the payments were not deductible business expenses. The court also found no partnership agreement requiring Mr. Reed to personally cover partnership costs, and no evidence the underlying loans had become worthless, since the project entities still held valuable real estate. As the court put it, taxpayers are bound by the tax consequences of the form they choose for a transaction, whether they intended those consequences or not.

The opinion also illustrates the limits of the Cohan doctrine, which sometimes allows courts to estimate deductions when records are incomplete. The Reeds tried to establish their basis in a partnership interest using a year-end Schedule K-1, but the court found the document did not reflect the timing of contributions and liabilities relative to when the units were actually sold. Because the record could not establish the Reeds’ basis at the relevant time, the court declined to estimate a number in their favor, noting that doing so would effectively substitute for the taxpayers’ burden of proof rather than fill a narrow evidentiary gap.

The taxpayers did prevail on a few issues. The court excluded a $40,000 deposit from a friend that was credibly shown to be a due diligence advance rather than income, and it allowed a $50,000 farmland rent deduction based on unrebutted testimony. The court also rejected a late, unproven attempt by the IRS to argue for an even larger capital gain. Still, the bulk of the deficiencies, along with additions to tax for late filing and accuracy-related penalties, were upheld.

Reed v. Commissioner underscores that separating personal and business finances, and documenting the terms of any related-party transfers in writing, can make the difference between a sustained deduction and a lost one. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

IRS Updates Guidance on the “No Tax on Overtime” Deduction

2 minute read

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On August 6, 2026, the IRS released Fact Sheet 2026-13, an expanded set of FAQs on the qualified overtime compensation deduction created by the One, Big Beautiful Bill Act. The update replaces January’s FS-2026-01 and marks the shift from 2025’s transition relief to the full compliance framework now in effect.

The deduction allows eligible individuals to deduct up to $12,500 ($25,000 for joint filers) of qualified overtime compensation each year, phasing out once modified adjusted gross income exceeds $150,000 ($300,000 for joint filers). It is available to itemizers and non-itemizers alike, but it is a deduction, not an exclusion. Overtime pay is still fully subject to income tax withholding, Social Security, and unemployment taxes. And only overtime actually required by Section 7 of the FLSA qualifies; overtime paid under a union contract, state law, or company policy alone does not.

Eligibility still turns on FLSA status rather than job title. Executive, administrative, professional, outside sales, and other traditionally exempt employees generally cannot generate qualified overtime, even if their employer pays them overtime voluntarily. The new FAQs add a helpful clarification here: employee-owners with at least a bona fide 20% equity stake who are actively involved in management are typically treated as exempt executives, so overtime paid to them usually will not qualify either.

On calculation, the IRS reaffirms that only the “half” in “time-and-a-half” counts, meaning only the premium required by the FLSA will qualify for the deduction, not the full overtime payment. If an employer voluntarily pays more than the law requires, only the statutorily required premium is deductible. The guidance also walks through trickier scenarios, like healthcare and public-safety workers under alternative FLSA computation methods, and state/local government employees who receive compensatory time off instead of cash, where the deduction attaches only when compensation time is actually paid out.

The most consequential piece of this update is on reporting. Starting in 2026, employers must separately state qualified overtime compensation on Form W-2, Box 12, Code TT (or, rarely, on a 1099). Unlike 2025, there is no more relief for missing entries. An employee simply cannot deduct overtime that is not reported this way. If an employer overstates the amount, the employee is limited to what was actually paid; if an employer understates it, the employee’s only fix is to request a corrected W-2c, and a self-prepared Form 4852 will not substitute. Employers also cannot unilaterally reduce withholding for the anticipated deduction unless the employee submits a new Form W-4 reflecting it.

A few other eligibility rules round out the guidance: employees need a Social Security number valid for employment, married couples must file jointly to claim the deduction, and federal employees are subject to a parallel, OPM-administered framework with its own rules for hours worked and compensatory time.

Given how much now hinges on accurate FLSA classification and precise W-2 reporting, employers should review their payroll practices and correct any errors promptly, while employees who spot a discrepancy on their W-2 should raise it with their employer well before filing season. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Louisiana Makes DOE’s Nuclear Shortlist

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The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has selected Louisiana and four other states to move forward as potential hosts for Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses, a federal initiative intended to strengthen the nation’s nuclear fuel cycle, from fuel production to the final disposition of used nuclear fuel. . Louisiana, Idaho, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah were selected from a pool of 26 applicant states and have each signed a memorandum of understanding to further evaluate potential campus locations. According to the DOE, a campus could attract up to $50 billion in capital investment, generate as much as $10 billion in state and local tax revenue, and create nearly 25,000 jobs. 

Louisiana’s proposal, which was lead by the Louisiana Department of Conservation & Energy (C&E) in conjunction with Louisiana Economic Development (LED), envisions a multi-site campus model across three specialized hubs: 

  1. LSU Innovation Park in Baton Rouge: would serve as the main hub for supply chain fabrication, heavy component manufacturing, materials testing, fuel conversion and enrichment, and workforce training.
  2. Military Installation in Northwest Louisiana: proposed for the testing and deployment of advanced small modular reactors (SMR) technology in a partnership with the Department of War and a large regional energy supplier.
  3. Port Fourchon Research Station: would be established to explore the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for geologic sequestration of spent nuclear fuel, specifically the offshore salt domes (and/or other strata). 

The proposal also addresses Louisiana-specific considerations that would require further development as the initiative moves forward, including workforce and supply chain development, infrastructure investment, permitting and regulatory coordination, legislative issues, and public engagement. The DOE is expected to select the final host states later this year, after which the selected states will negotiate and sign formal hosting agreements. The initial timetable contemplates bringing the first campus facilities online as early as 2027.

For further questions regarding this topic, contact Liskow attorney Cristian Soler.

Louisiana Rewrites the Rules of Getting Paid: What Act 822 of 2026 Means for Companies Involved in Industrial Construction

2 minute read

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Act 822 of the 2026 Regular Session (House Bill 638, by Representative Jacob Landry) is a dramatic change in Louisiana private construction law. It amends and reenacts Louisiana’s private prompt-payment statute (La. R.S. § 9:2784) into a comprehensive prompt-payment regime that runs from the top of the payment chain to the bottom.  The new rule becomes effective August 1, 2026.

Three features make Act 822 highly consequential for companies involved in industrial construction. First, the Act imposes a direct, enforceable duty on owners to pay their contractors on a fixed statutory deadline. Second, it dramatically increases and restructures the penalties for late payments by contractors and subcontractors. Third, it declares that “[a] waiver of a provision of this Section shall be absolutely null.” That converts the payment timeline from a set of default rules the parties could contract around into a mandatory floor that private contracts cannot lower.

Under Act 822, if an owner of immovable property receives a written payment request from a contractor for an amount payable under a construction contract, the owner must pay the amount owed no later than thirty-five days after receiving the request, in the absence of a good-faith dispute. 

Act 822 provides that contractors and subcontractors must pay their subcontractors within seven days of receiving payment, absent a good-faith dispute.  If a good-faith dispute exists, the new law requires any undisputed amounts to be paid within the seven days of receiving payment. The law provides that a good-faith dispute includes a dispute over whether the work was “performed in a proper manner under the contract.”

If the owner, contractor, or subcontractor fails to pay pursuant to the statutory deadlines, it is subject to a penalty of 1.5% of the unpaid amount per month.

Act 822 also provides that if an action for payment is brought, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney fees and court costs.

Importantly, Act 822 carves out contracts related to the oil and gas industry.

Given the language in Act 822 preventing companies from contracting around its deadlines, it will be important for companies working in construction in Louisiana to ensure their accounting procedures will timely fulfill the strict payment obligations created by Act 822.

For further questions regarding what Act 822 of 2026 means for companies involved in industrial construction or related topics, contact Liskow attorney Hunter Chauvin.

House Advances Sweeping Maritime Reforms in FY27 Defense Bill

2 minute read

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On July 22, 2026, the House narrowly approved the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8800) by a vote of 216 to 212, sending the measure to the Senate. Tucked inside the massive defense policy bill are two amendments that, together, amount to the broadest rewrite of federal maritime law in a generation.

A New Shipbuilding and Governance Framework

The first amendment, sponsored by Seapower Subcommittee Chair Trent Kelly (R-MS), reworks the “Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security for America Act.” Among its most notable features, the bill would create a new maritime security advisor position within the Executive Office of the President to lead a Maritime Security Board and coordinate the country’s overall maritime strategy. It also sets up a Maritime Security Trust Fund, capped at $20 billion, to support shipbuilding and the broader industrial base, with actual funding left to future budget requests.

On cargo preference, the amendment would push the government cargo requirement from 50 percent to a full 100 percent, consolidate waiver decisions with the Maritime Administrator, and create a new “Ship America Office” to oversee compliance. A related grant program would direct federal dollars toward vessel construction and shipyard investment, subject to Buy America restrictions. The bill would also rewrite parts of the 1851 Limitation of Liability Act, imposing a higher liability cap on foreign vessel owners than on US owners, and would extend Federal Maritime Commission oversight of unfair practices to passenger fares. More than 20 sections focus on workforce development, covering education funding, mariner recruitment, and career retention.

Coast Guard and a New Commercial Cargo Regime

The second amendment, introduced by Coast Guard Subcommittee Chair Mike Ezell (R-MS), implements several proposals drawn from the administration’s Maritime Action Plan. It expands the Federal Ship Financing Program to cover vessel retrofitting and updates key definitions used to evaluate financing applications, opening the door to first-time eligibility for certain fishing vessels. It also increases funding for maritime innovation programs and adds new Buy America sourcing requirements for Coast Guard equipment procurement.

Most significantly, this amendment would create the first mandatory US-flag participation rule reaching into private commercial shipping, covering containerized cargo and roll-on/roll-off vehicles. Participation would phase in gradually, with US-content requirements rising over time, and foreign-influenced vessel owners would need an approved security agreement with US-citizen oversight to take part.

Looking Ahead

With the Senate yet to advance its own version, negotiators are expected to move directly to conference talks once Congress reconvenes in September. Given the range of issues at stake, from governance and cargo rules to shipbuilding finance and vessel security, conference is a critical opportunity to shape how these provisions are reconciled. We will continue tracking this legislation and are available to help clients evaluate its potential impact. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.