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Blogs

EPA Proposes Updates to NPDES Definitions and Exclusions

September 25, 20263 minute read

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On September 4, 2026, EPA published a proposed rule to revise the regulatory definition of “discharge of a pollutant” to accurately implement the statutory exclusion of vessels and other floating craft that add pollutants in the contiguous zone or the ocean. 91 Fed. Reg. 56819 (Sept. 4,  2026). As a result, such discharges would be expressly excluded from the regulatory definitions of “discharge of a pollutant” and “discharge” and would not be subject to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program requirements. While this proposal might catch the attention of the operators of certain maritime vessels or platforms, such as Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs), that are sometimes treated as a vessel and sometimes as a point source, it is important to note that EPA’s proposed rule states that the “primarily potentially affected operations” are offshore seafood harvesting and processing from vessels that discharge in the contiguous zone or the ocean, and that offshore oil and gas production entities are unlikely to be affected.

The Clean Water Act (CWA) generally prohibits discharges into navigable waters, the contiguous zone, and the ocean without first obtaining an NPDES permit. “Discharge of a pollutant” or “discharge” is defined differently based on the geographic location of the receiving water. For waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean, CWA § 502(12)(B) defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.” Thus, additions of pollutants from a vessel or other floating craft into waters of the contiguous zone or ocean are expressly excluded from this definition and not within the scope of the NPDES permitting program.

However, the current regulatory definition of “discharge of a pollutant” in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 appears to narrow the statutory exclusion provided by CWA § 502(12) by limiting its application to a vessel or other floating craft in the contiguous zone or ocean that “is being used as a means of transportation.” Similarly, 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) provides that a vessel or other floating craft that adds pollutants to the waters of the contiguous zone or ocean is not excluded from NPDES permit requirements when it is operating in any additional capacity “other than as a means of transportation.”

As such, EPA is proposing to clarify that NPDES permitting “does not apply to pollutant additions from certain vessel offshore operations in the contiguous zone and ocean.” In particular, the proposal, if finalized, “would provide that, in either the contiguous zone or the ocean, a vessel or other floating craft that is not secured to the seabed does not require NPDES permit authorization to add pollutants to such waters.” EPA is also proposing to add an explanatory phrase that a point source is “secured” when “it is either permanently attached to the seabed or is a buoyant facility substantially moored to the seabed, such that it cannot be moved without special effort through an undertaking from outside and separate from the facility, to change the location of the facility, or it is a mobile offshore drilling unit engaged in drilling operations.” 

As a result, most entities, such as ocean placer mining (exclusively in waters of the United States), offshore oil and gas production (secured via risers), and most offshore aquaculture (net pens secured), are unlikely to be affected. Rather, the primarily potentially affected operations, according to EPA, are offshore seafood harvesting and processing from vessels that discharge in the contiguous zone or the ocean.

Regardless, EPA’s proposed rule cautions that dumping and other activities by vessels into either the contiguous zone or the ocean “may be subject to other statutory or regulatory requirements imposed by other statutes such as the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990 (OPA), and the Vessel Incidental Discharge Act (VIDA).” 

Comments on the proposed rule are due by October 19, 2026.

Liskow will continue to monitor for updates regarding EPA’s proposed rule. For further questions regarding this topic, contact Liskow attorneys Greg Johnson, Clare Bienvenu, Emily von Qualen, and Colin North.

The effect of these changes would be that the addition of pollutants by a vessel or other floating craft in the contiguous zone or the ocean that is not secured to the seabed would not be a discharge and would not require CWA NPDES permit authorization to add pollutants to those waters.

www.federalregister.gov/…

Blogs

Podcast: Call Before You Dig: Understanding Pipeline Law and Safety

September 25, 2026less than a minute

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In this week’s episode of “Energy Law This Week,” hosts Matt Jones and April L. Rolen-Ogden sit down with attorneys Roina Rivera and Hayley O’Neill from O’Neill and Rivera to discuss the evolving landscape of pipeline law and safety. They examine key regulatory requirements, recent changes affecting the industry, and the legal and practical considerations for those navigating pipeline safety and regulatory compliance. The conversation also explores what these developments mean for legal professionals, industry stakeholders, and others working in the pipeline industry. 

Listen to the full episode here. 

Blogs

MARAD Proposes First Major Overhaul of Capital Construction Fund Regulations in Nearly 50 Years

September 25, 20262 minute read

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The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has published a notice of proposed rulemaking that would substantially revise the regulations governing the Capital Construction Fund (CCF) Program, found at 46 CFR Part 390. Published in the Federal Register on September 22, 2026, this is the first comprehensive update to the CCF regulations since MARAD first introduced them in 1976.

The CCF Program allows owners and operators of U.S. flagged vessels to defer federal income tax on earnings deposited into a CCF account, provided those funds are ultimately used to construct, reconstruct, or acquire qualifying vessels. Deferred taxes are eventually recovered when a vessel financed with CCF funds is sold, since the vessel’s cost basis is reduced by the amount of CCF funds used unless the proceeds are re-deposited into a CCF account. As of the proposed rule, there were 129 active CCF Agreements holding approximately $2.56 billion on deposit.

The proposed rule conforms MARAD’s regulations to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, which extended CCF Program eligibility to all U.S. built vessels engaged in either domestic or foreign commerce, eliminating prior restrictions limiting the program to certain geographic trades. Because the existing regulatory text was never updated to reflect this expansion, vessel owners have faced confusion and administrative burden, including outdated liquidated damages provisions tied to now obsolete trading restrictions.

The proposed rule also introduces a new mechanism to automatically terminate CCF Agreements that have gone inactive. Specifically, agreements where a program objective has not commenced within ten years, or where the account balance has fallen to zero for ten years without an active objective, the Agreement will terminate automatically. MARAD explains that many existing agreements were established years ago for projects that are no longer viable, leaving account holders to either let funds sit idle or make a non-qualified withdrawal and pay deferred taxes at the highest marginal rate.

Other notable changes include clarifying the maximum completion time for reconstruction projects, expanding the ability to use CCF funds for vessel acquisitions, and raising the minimum reconstruction program threshold from a strict $1,000,000 per-vessel requirement to a more flexible $3,000,000 threshold that can be met by aggregating the costs of multiple smaller vessels. MARAD estimates this could open the program to smaller operators, since over 80 percent of the roughly 1,800 operators on the nation’s inland waterways run ten or fewer vessels and were previously excluded by the per-vessel minimum.

There are a number of other rule changes.  Some are less favorable to account holders.  For example, historically, MARAD allowed a CCF account holder to purchase used vessels with CCF funds as part of a CCF program (even if the vessels were not substantially reconstructed).  

Comments on the proposed rule are due within 60 days of publication. Vessel owners, operators, and shipyards currently participating in or considering the CCF Program should review the proposed regulatory text closely, particularly the new automatic termination provisions, since existing account holders with inactive or zero balance agreements may need to take affirmative steps to preserve their agreements once the rule is finalized. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

City of New Orleans Announces Sales Tax Amnesty Program

September 23, 20262 minute read

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The City of New Orleans Department of Finance recently announced that it is offering a Sales Tax Amnesty Program for businesses to pay overdue sales tax. All penalties, negligence fees, and 50% of the interest charged on delinquent balances will be waived during the amnesty period. Amnesty ends December 31, 2026.

The City’s website states that amnesty may be available for outstanding:

  • Sales taxes
  • Use taxes
  • Hotel/motel taxes
  • Parking taxes
  • Alcoholic beverage gallonage taxes
  • Occupational license taxes; and
  • Various permits.

Property taxes do not qualify for the City’s Amnesty Program.

In order to participate in the Amnesty Program, taxpayers must complete and submit the Amnesty Application, provide gross sales information for the months under consideration and be prepared to pay all delinquent amounts that qualify under the amnesty period. 

The City’s website provides that Taxpayers may be given the opportunity to make payments through an installment agreement.  The Amnesty installment terms include making a 50% down payment on the balance due and six (6) equal remaining payments.  All amnesty installment agreements must be paid in full by December 31, 2026, though. If the amnesty settlement is not paid, penalties and interest will be restored to the original liability amount.

According to the Department of Finance’s website, the program may be available to taxpayers who:

  • Failed to file a tax return and pay the tax due.
  • Failed to register or file sales or another type of tax, license, or permit.
  • Are currently under an installment agreement or have defaulted on an installment agreement.
  • Underpaid tax or have an outstanding sales tax balance.
  • Failed to pay for or renew an Occupational License permit.
  • Are currently under audit or in litigation for sales tax matters.
  • Misrepresented or omitted tax due.
  • Have sales tax liens on personal or business property.
  • Claimed incorrect credits or deductions on tax returns.

The City of New Orleans requires certified funds for payment, including cashier’s checks or money orders.  In addition, credit card payments will also accepted for applications submitted online and in person.

In light of the expansion of the sales tax base in Louisiana after the enactment of historic tax reform in 2024, taxpayers doing business in or who have nexus with the City of New Orleans are advised to conduct self-audits to determine whether they have exposure for delinquent sales and use taxes that might be settled through the Amnesty Sales Tax Program.

For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Bob Angelico, Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

 

Blogs

Second Circuit Furthers Circuit Split by Affirming Functional Test for “Limited Partner” Self-Employment Tax Exception

September 18, 20262 minute read

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The Second Circuit has affirmed the Tax Court’s rulings against Soroban Capital Partners LP, holding that the firm’s three principals were not “limited partners” for purposes of the self-employment tax exclusion found in I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13), despite formally holding limited partner status under Delaware law. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a partner’s distributive share of partnership income is generally treated as self-employment income subject to the 15.3 percent self-employment tax on income up to $184,500 in 2026 (2.9 percent rate above that threshold), which funds Social Security and Medicare. Section 1402(a)(13), however, excludes from that tax the distributive share of a “limited partner, as such,” other than guaranteed payments for services rendered. This rule also applies to LLCs taxed as partnerships.

Soroban’s three founding principals received roughly $141.5 million in distributive shares over the 2016 and 2017 tax years, which the firm excluded from self-employment income on the theory that the principals were limited partners. The IRS disagreed, reasoning that the principals exercised full managerial control over the firm and could not be treated as limited partners for tax purposes, and issued adjustments increasing Soroban’s taxable income accordingly.

The Second Circuit first rejected Soroban’s argument that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the adjustments, holding that net earnings from self-employment qualifies as a partnership item properly determined at the partnership level under the now repealed TEFRA audit procedures. On the merits, the court conducted an extensive review of the term “limited partner” as understood in 1977, when Congress enacted Section 1402(a)(13). The court examined contemporaneous dictionaries, treatises, state limited partnership statutes, and the legislative history of the Social Security Amendments of 1977. The court concluded that a limited partner, for purposes of the statute, must have both limited liability and a lack of managerial control over the partnership’s business. Because Soroban’s principals ran the firm’s day-to-day operations, sat on its governing committees, and made hiring and firing decisions, the court held they did not qualify for the exclusion, regardless of their formal state law title.

Notably, the Second Circuit’s opinion directly acknowledges a split with the Fifth Circuit. In K Alain L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit held that a limited partner is one who plays no “significant role” in managing or running the business. The Second Circuit suggested the Fifth Circuit approach may not differ dramatically in substance from the Tax Court’s “passive investor” framework, though the two circuits arrived at their tests through different reasoning and with a notable dissent in the Fifth Circuit questioning whether any functional test is appropriate at all. The Second Circuit also noted that a similar case, Denham Capital Management LP v. Commissioner, is currently pending before the First Circuit following oral argument earlier this year.

Given the growing number of circuits weighing in with varying tests and reasoning, this issue appears likely to require resolution by the United States Supreme Court. Partnerships with similarly structured limited partner arrangements should closely monitor developments in the First Circuit and consider reassessing self-employment tax positions for principals who exercise operational control, regardless of their formal partnership designation. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

Louisiana Fourth Circuit Holds City Must Pay $8.2 Million Tax Refund Judgment, Rejects Appropriation Defense

September 18, 20263 minute read

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On September 10, in Monahan v. City of New Orleans, No. 2025-CA-0757, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a district court judgment compelling the City of New Orleans to pay an $8,284,084.51 tax refund judgment through a writ of mandamus, rejecting the City’s argument that payment remained discretionary absent a specific legislative appropriation.

The litigation traces back to a 1998 city ordinance that imposed penalties and collection fees on delinquent ad valorem property taxes. In 2008, the Louisiana Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional to the extent it imposed penalties beyond interest on delinquent property taxes. After further proceedings, including class certification in 2015, the district court entered judgment in April 2023 declaring the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to the certified class. In April 2024, the court fixed the total reimbursement amount owed to the class. The City did not appeal either judgment, and both became final. When the City failed to pay, the class representative sought a writ of mandamus to compel payment, which the district court granted in July 2025.

On appeal, the City argued that no statute specifically authorized mandamus in this context, distinguishing this case from Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C. v. Bridges, where specific refund statutes governing state taxes expressly required payment and authorized mandamus. The City contended that under Louisiana Constitution Article XII, Section 10(C) and La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2), judgments against political subdivisions are payable only from specifically appropriated funds, and that ordering payment from the general fund would violate separation of powers.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed. Writing for the panel, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano held that Louisiana Constitution Article VII, Section 3(A), which requires “a complete and adequate remedy for the prompt recovery of an illegal tax,” combined with Article V, Section 35, which extends that remedy to unconstitutional taxes, supplies a specific constitutional exception to the general appropriation requirement. The court reasoned that an unsatisfied judgment does not constitute “recovery” of an illegal tax any more than an unsatisfied inverse condemnation judgment constitutes payment of just compensation, drawing on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent decision in Watson Memorial Spiritual Temple of Christ v. Korban. The court distinguished several cases for the City on the ground that none involved a constitutional provision specifically guaranteeing recovery of an illegal or unconstitutional tax.

Notably, the court found that the City’s administrative payment practices, including its policy of allocating $2 million annually toward judgments on a chronological basis, could not override the constitutional guarantee. Taxpayers seeking refunds of illegal tax exactions are not similarly situated to ordinary tort and contract judgment creditors. 

Ratified by voters in 2019, this is the second time that Louisiana courts have relied upon Article V, Section 35, to preserve taxpayers’ rights to contest the payment of unlawful taxes or fees.  In Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC v. Lopinto, App. 5 Cir.2022, 354 So.3d 69, 22-204 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/2/22), writ denied 356 So.3d 341, 2022-01761 (La. 2/24/23), the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that Article V, Section 35 supported the Board of Tax Appeals’ conclusion that it had jurisdiction to act as a trial court and conduct a de novo review, rather than act as an appellate court relative to the redetermination of a tax assessment.

For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Bob Angelico, Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

FASB’s New Fair Value Standard May Bolster Marketability Discounts in Estate Planning

September 11, 20262 minute read

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The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Accounting Standards Update 2026-03, Fair Value Measurement (Topic 820): Investment Companies with Equity Securities Subject to Contractual Sale Restrictions, on September 9, 2026. While the update is aimed at investment company accounting, it could benefit estate planners and valuation professionals who regularly defend marketability discounts on closely held and restricted stock.

Under existing GAAP, a contractual restriction on the sale of an equity security is not considered when measuring that security’s fair value. As a result, an entity holding restricted shares and an entity holding freely tradable shares of the same investee typically report the same fair value, even though the restricted shares would command a lower price in an actual sale. Stakeholders told FASB that this approach can overstate net asset value, distort performance reporting, and create inequitable outcomes among purchasing, redeeming, and remaining shareholders in funds that hold restricted positions.

ASU 2026-03 addresses this by creating an exception within Topic 820 specifically for investment companies within the scope of Topic 946, Financial Services, Investment Companies. Under the new standard, these investment companies must factor a contractual sale restriction into the fair value measurement of an equity security, rather than ignoring it as under current practice. The update also requires investment companies to separately disclose the dollar amount of the discount attributable to the contractual sale restriction. The amendments are effective for annual reporting periods beginning after December 15, 2027, and interim periods within those years, with early adoption permitted for investment companies covered by the update.

FASB’s explicit acknowledgment that contractual sale restrictions measurably affect the value a market participant would pay for a security lends additional credibility to the general principle underlying marketability discounts. While ASU 2026-03 does not itself govern tax valuations and does not bind the IRS or the Tax Court, it may serve as a helpful reference point for valuation experts articulating why restricted or illiquid interests are worth less than their unrestricted counterparts, and it reinforces that this concept is not merely a taxpayer-favorable litigation position, but a principle now recognized in mainstream financial reporting standards.

Estate planners preparing valuations for gift and estate tax purposes, particularly those involving family-owned entities with transfer restrictions, buy-sell agreements, or other limitations on marketability, should be aware of this update and consider whether it strengthens the analytical footing for discounts already being claimed. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

District Court Finds New York’s Climate Change Superfund Act Preempted by “Federal Interests”

September 10, 20262 minute read

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On August 31, 2026, a district judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York held that the State’s Climate Change Superfund Act (or the Act) is preempted and thus cannot be enforced. West Virginia v. James, No. 1:25-cv-00168 (N.D.N.Y. 2026). This decision is a significant development in the emerging dispute over state climate Superfund laws, which generally seek to require fossil fuel companies to contribute toward the costs of climate change adaptation in the respective state.

Background

In December 2024, New York enacted the Climate Change Superfund Act, which established a “climate change adaptation cost recovery program” directed at major fossil fuel companies deemed responsible for historic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Under the Act, covered companies would collectively be required to pay approximately $75 billion, with each company responsible for its “proportionate share,” to fund infrastructure investments and other projects addressing the impacts of climate change in New York.

District Court’s Opinion

The district court, relying in large part on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021), held that the Act was preempted on several grounds. 

First, the district court found that the Act was preempted because it conflicted with “federal interests” that are incompatible with the application of state law, namely the “overriding … need for a uniform rule of decision on matters influencing national energy and environmental policy, and [] basic interests of federalism.” Second, the court held that the CAA, which displaced federal common law claims concerned with domestic GHG emissions, preempts the Act because the CAA does not authorize New York to impose liability for those emissions. The court also concluded that EPA’s recission of the 2009 endangerment finding “has no impact” on its analysis, reasoning that how EPA chooses to exercise its Congressionally-delegated authority to regulate GHG emissions does not affect the CAA’s preemptive force. Finally, the court held that the foreign affairs doctrine preempted the Act to the extent it imposed liability on foreign fossil fuel companies. New York Governor Kathy Hochul has indicated that the State is looking at its options for appealing the district court’s decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal.

Other states, including California, Illinois, and Hawaii, have considered similar climate Superfund legislation, but New York and Vermont remain the only states to have enacted such laws. Vermont enacted its Climate Superfund Act in May 2024, and it similarly requires major fossil fuel companies to contribute toward the costs of addressing climate change impacts in the State. Vermont’s Climate Superfund Act is currently the subject of litigation before the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, where challenges remain pending. 

Liskow continues to monitor developments related to these state climate Superfund laws, both in the state legislatures and as they progress through the courts. For further questions regarding this topic, contact Liskow attorneys Greg Johnson, Clare Bienvenu, Emily von Qualen, and Colin North.

"For the reasons that follow, … Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment are granted because the Court finds that the Climate Act is preempted."

files.passle.net/…

Blogs

IRS Finalizes Rules on the New Car Loan Interest Deduction

September 10, 20263 minute read

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The Treasury Department and IRS issued final regulations implementing the new deduction for qualified passenger vehicle loan interest (QPVLI), a temporary benefit created by the One, Big, Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) that allows individuals to deduct up to $10,000 of interest paid on certain auto loans, even if they do not itemize deductions. The final rules largely adopt the proposed regulations issued in January 2026 but include clarifications in response to public comments received by the Treasury Department.

The deduction applies to interest paid on indebtedness incurred in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2024  and before January 1, 2029. To qualify, the loan must be secured by a first lien on an “applicable passenger vehicle,” meaning a car, minivan, van, sport utility vehicle, pickup truck, or motorcycle with a gross vehicle weight rating under 14,000 pounds, whose original use commences with the taxpayer, and whose final assembly occurred within the United States. Vehicles assembled outside the United States do not qualify, regardless of the manufacturer’s headquarters location, and taxpayers may verify assembly location using the vehicle’s VIN or the window sticker.

The final regulations clarify several points that generated significant comment activity. On the personal use requirement, the rules confirm that a taxpayer’s expectation of majority personal use is tested only at the time the loan is incurred, not on an ongoing basis, so a later change in how the vehicle is actually used does not disqualify previously accrued interest. On loan structure, the regulations confirm that amounts customarily financed alongside the vehicle purchase, such as extended warranties, service plans, sales tax, and now vehicle-related accessories and GAP insurance, may be included in the qualifying loan balance, while negative equity rolled over from a trade-in remains excluded because it relates to a separate, prior purchase transaction. Interest must be allocated between qualifying and non-qualifying portions of a loan on a pro rata basis, a method the final rules retain despite industry requests for alternative approaches.

The regulations also confirm that the $10,000 annual cap applies per return regardless of filing status, and that taxpayers with multiple qualifying loans may aggregate interest across all of them before applying the cap. The deduction phases out for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income above $100,000 (or $200,000 for joint filers), reduced by $200 for every $1,000 of income above that threshold, with no exception for head of household filers despite requests for a separate threshold.

A significant portion of the final rules addresses new information reporting obligations under Section 6050AA. Lenders and other interest recipients that receive $600 or more in qualifying interest from an individual in a calendar year must file an information return, soon to be captured on Form 1098-VLI, and furnish a statement to the borrower that includes a legend warning that the reported interest may not be fully deductible. Despite extensive industry pushback arguing that lenders lack the data needed to determine vehicle eligibility, Treasury declined to adopt a safe harbor and confirmed that lenders bear the burden of collecting the necessary information, including VINs and assembly location, to comply.

The regulations take effect 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. Individual taxpayers financing a new vehicle should confirm eligibility criteria before assuming any interest paid will qualify for the deduction. For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Leon Rittenberg III, Caroline Lafourcade, and Kevin Naccari, and visit Liskow’s Tax Practice page.

Blogs

Proposed Rule Changes Would Affect Groundwater Monitoring at Legacy Oilfield Sites

September 9, 20262 minute read

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The Louisiana Department of Conservation and Energy (C&E) recently released proposed rule changes regarding groundwater management, consolidating existing water well rules into Title 43, Part VI of the La. Administrative Code and proposing new rules that may affect current practices for evaluating groundwater at legacy oilfield sites. 

Separately Evaluating Groundwater Zones

To investigate potential impacts to groundwater at an oilfield site, an interested party typically installs monitoring wells to sample and test water at various depths below the land surface. Under the proposed revisions, monitoring wells would be classified within a new, broader category of “environmental wells,” defined as water wells “usually installed in an area of known or suspected contamination used to obtain hydrologic data, water quality data, information on water resources of an area, or to recover or treat contaminated groundwater.” 

Environmental wells and other water wells contain screens set at certain depths to allow the influx of groundwater. The proposed rules contain a new provision stating that no water well or environmental well may have a screen that extends across more than one distinct aquifer layer, and that connecting two or more distinct water-bearing zones is “strictly prohibited.” As a result, parties would be required to separately evaluate each distinct groundwater zone by installing a separate screen or well for each zone.

Plugging Environmental Wells

The pending revisions also add rules for plugging environmental wells. Existing regulations require that all abandoned wells be plugged within 90 days of their abandonment. Under the proposed revisions, environmental wells would be considered abandoned on the earliest date on which “they no longer serve a purpose, they are damaged beyond repair or the project they are associated with is terminated,” whereupon the owner of the well would be responsible for plugging the environmental well within 30 days. This would appear to clarify that each monitoring well installed in conjunction with the investigation of a legacy oilfield site must be promptly plugged by the party who installed it upon the conclusion of the investigation and any associated agency or court proceedings.     

Other Proposed Changes

In addition to the changes discussed above, C&E is proposing changes on other topics, such as management of groundwater resources by lowering the threshold for “large volume” water wells from 1,500 to 300 gallons per minute, thus expanding the water-producing wells that would be subject to metering, monitoring, and production limits. The proposed changes would also allow C&E to create “Areas of Investigation” in order to collect data on certain aquifers that could potentially be later designated as “Areas of Groundwater Concern” under La. R.S. 30:3097.6 of existing law, which focuses on aquifer supply and quality. C&E is soliciting comments on these and other proposed groundwater management rule changes through October 15, 2026, and you can download the full draft of the proposed changes here.

For more information about this update, contact Liskow attorneys Amy Lee and Joe Heaton, and visit Liskow’s Energy – Litigation and Energy – Regulatory practice pages. 

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