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On May 22, 2025, several environmental groups, RISE St. James, Micah Six Eight Mission, The Descendants Project, The Concerned Citizens of St. John Inc., Claiborne Avenue Alliance Design Studio, Inc., and JOIN for Clean Air, have sued Louisiana public officials charged with enforcing the State’s Community Air Monitoring Reliability Act (“CAMRA” or “the Act”) in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging that the CAMRA violates their constitutional rights and is preempted by the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). RISE St. James Louisiana v. Burdette, (M.D. La. May 22, 2025). The groups’ complaint requests the court to declare CAMRA unconstitutional and to permanently enjoin Louisiana officials from enforcing the Act.

In particular, the groups allege that, although the CAMRA purports to ensure that data collected from community air monitoring programs “provides the public with access to accurate air quality information,” the Act’s requirements instead unlawfully “restrict how community groups can collect, use, and disseminate information about air quality.”

As an alternative to more costly EPA-regulatory grade monitors, or Federal Reference Methods (FRM), community groups use low-cost air sensor technology to monitor air pollution levels in certain areas of the country. When engaged in collecting, using, and disseminating this air monitoring information, the groups contend that they are engaging in constitutionally protected speech. As such, the groups argue that CAMRA unconstitutionally restricts their speech because it allows them to collect air monitoring information using these air sensors, as opposed to federally-approved methods, only if the groups do not use that information to allege a violation of, or noncompliance with, the CAA, Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, or any other applicable law, rule, or regulation for which the state has primary enforcement authority. In other words, the groups contend that CAMRA prevents them from disseminating monitoring data to the public in the manner of their own choosing. Supporters of CAMRA would likely argue that it does not restrict the use of non-FRM data for all speech. The provisions were intended only to prevent its use in agency or citizen enforcement.

The groups further allege that these restrictions do not apply to industry participants because CAMRA excludes from its application “any organization, group, company, owner, or operator of a stationary source developing or administering an air monitoring program.” Accordingly, CAMRA creates, as the groups put it, “speaker-based distinctions that presume that air monitoring information lacks accuracy if disseminated by community air monitoring groups, but not by industry participants or the state.” Because Louisiana lacks a legitimate compelling interest in restricting the groups’ speech in the manner that CAMRA does and has not tailored the Act to achieve a legitimate state interest, the groups claim that it violates their First Amendment rights.

Additionally, the groups in their complaint argue that, because the CAMRA “effectively prevents” them from conducting air monitoring using non-FRM air sensors, the Act conflicts with the CAA and with EPA efforts to encourage broader adoption of community air monitoring. The groups also complain that the CAMRA restricts the groups’ ability to share air monitoring information with EPA to support, for example, enforcement actions, which the complaint says “conflict[s] with Clean Air Act provisions that authorize EPA to bring enforcement actions based on ‘any information available’ about potential violations of emissions standards and that reward persons that furnish information to EPA for information that result in successful enforcement actions.”

Ultimately, the groups claim that they are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief to bar the Louisiana officials from enforcing CAMRA’s requirements against them because the CAMRA violates the groups’ constitutional rights and conflicts with federal law.

Liskow will be monitoring this litigation for further updates. For more information on the Community Air Monitoring Reliability Act and potential industry impacts, please contact Liskow attorneys Greg Johnson, Clare Bienvenu, and Colin North and visit our Environmental Regulatory practice page.

On May 9, 2025, the Texas Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in Roxo Energy Co., LLC v. Baxsto, LLC, — S.W.3d —, No. 23-0564, 2025 WL 1349581 (Tex. May 9, 2025), in which it held that a lessee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a lessor’s claims for fraud, fraudulent inducement, statutory fraud, and fraud by non-disclosure, all arising from the lessee’s alleged oral representations that were inconsistent with the parties’ written contracts.

In October 2016, Baxsto, LLC (“Baxsto”), which owned mineral interests in Howard and Borden Counties, Texas, entered into negotiations with the CEO of Roxo Energy Co., LLC (“Roxo”). Baxsto alleged that Roxo made the following representations during negotiations:

1. If Baxsto quickly executed an oil and gas lease, Roxo would give Baxsto the best deal for all the owners in the area;
2. Roxo was not in the business of flipping leases to new operators;
3. Roxo would drill and develop the land.

Additionally, Roxo repeatedly indicated that it was interested in purchasing the minerals. Eventually, the parties executed a paid-up oil and gas lease, a lease memorandum, and lease purchase agreement. The agreements provided, in part, that Roxo could only record the lease after paying Baxsto a bonus of $5,000.00 per acre and that Roxo could purchase the lease within a certain period. Roxo received two extensions on its lease purchase option—the first of which included a “most favored nations” clause stating that if Roxo paid a larger bonus to another qualifying lessor within the next six months, Baxsto would receive the same amount from Roxo. Before the second extension, Roxo disclosed that it was negotiating with Navigator Oil and Gas (“Navigator”), another mineral owner in the same acreage. Roxo paid the bonus and acquired the lease after the second extension. Not long thereafter, on May 26, 2017, Baxsto sold its mineral interest to Roxo for $5,666,602.50.

Contrary to the alleged oral representations made during the initial negotiations, Roxo never drilled a well on Baxsto’s acreage, sold the minerals to another operator, and paid Navigator a bonus of $11,000.00 per acre ($6,000.00 more per acre than what Baxsto received). Baxsto asserted claims for fraud, fraudulent inducement, statutory fraud, and fraud by non-disclosure, claiming that, during the negotiations, Roxo made false oral representations with the intent to induce Baxsto into an unproductive lease and then later sell its mineral interest for a price below market value. The trial court granted summary judgment for Roxo, and the court of appeals reversed. Roxo then appealed the decision to the Texas Supreme Court.

Baxsto’s fraud claims all required proof that it justifiably relied on Roxo’s representations. Justifiable reliance requires proof that (1) the plaintiff actually relied on the defendant’s representation; and (2) such reliance was justifiable. Reliance on oral representations is not justifiable, however, when the oral representations are directly contradicted by the express and unambiguous terms of a written agreement between the parties.

The court of appeals held that the direct contradiction rule did not apply. It reasoned that the lease’s most favored nations clause did not contradict Roxo’s representation regarding bonus payments because its plain terms—mandating that Baxsto would receive a matching bonus payment if Roxo paid a larger bonus to any other mineral owners in the area—was actually some evidence that Baxsto did rely on Roxo’s representation. To the extent that Roxo represented that it would not pay any mineral owners a bonus payment exceeding $5,000 after the most favored nations clause expired, the most favored nations clause could not have contradicted that representation because the clause had expired and was no longer applicable. Further, the court reasoned that the absence in the lease of an obligation to drill did not contradict Roxo’s representation that it would drill and develop the land because the two promises could be plausibly reconciled. Baxsto could have plausibly believed that Roxo would choose to drill and develop the land given their mutual interest in developing acreage under the lease despite having no obligation to do so under the terms of the lease. The court also reasoned that the lease’s assignment clause did not contradict Roxo’s representation that it was not in the business of flipping leases because Roxo only represented that it was not “in the business”of flipping leases, which was only an expression regarding the purpose of Roxo’s business operations and not an expression that Roxo would not exercise the lease’s assignment provision. The court considered those facts to be distinct from the facts in a similar case, Barrow-Shaver Resources Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 498 (Tex. 2019), because, in that case, the lessor orally represented that it would work with the lessee on any assignment of the lease, regardless of consent, and the lease required the lessee to receive the lessor’s written consent before assigning the lease. Finally, the court held that Roxo failed to show that Baxsto could not have justifiably relied on Roxo’s oral representation that it would not record the lease until after it paid the lease bonus to Baxsto because Roxo failed to show any contradictory terms in the lease.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed this decision based on the direct contradiction rule. Concerning Roxo’s representation that Baxsto would receive the best deal of all owners in the area, the Court viewed the absence of any terms in the lease (aside from the most favored nations clause) reflecting that representation as a red flag in itself that negated justifiable reliance. The Court characterized Baxsto as a sophisticated party with experience in the oil and gas industry, and such a party should have recognized that the absence of previously discussed terms from a written agreement meant that such terms were no longer a part of the deal. With regard to Roxo’s representation that it would develop, rather than flip, the lease, the Court held that Baxsto could not have justifiably relied on Roxo’s representation because the lease gave Roxo an unqualified right to assign, rather than develop, the lease. The Court, like the court of appeals, also relied on Barrow-Shaver, but, unlike the court of appeals, considered the facts to be analogous to the case at hand because “[j]ust as an unqualified contractual right to withhold consent contradicts a prior oral promise to give consent, an unqualified right to transfer a lease contradicts a prior oral promise not to do so.” While the Court acknowledged that Roxo represented that it was “in the business” of developing rather than flipping leases, it reasoned that regardless of Roxo’s representation of its business operations, Baxsto entered into a written agreement that allowed Roxo to no longer be “in the business” of developing rather than flipping leases. Finally, the Court held that Roxo did not commit fraud by nondisclosure by recording the lease prior to paying the lease bonus to Baxsto because fraud by nondisclosure requires proof that the defendant had a legal duty to disclose facts to the plaintiff, and Roxo—having no confidential or fiduciary relationship with Baxsto—owed no duty disclose that it had prematurely recorded the lease.

For further questions regarding this opinion, contact Liskow attorneys Jana Grauberger, J.T. Kittrell, Sam Allen, and Margaret Chavez, and visit our Energy Litigation practice page.

In this episode of “Energy Law This Week,” hosts Matt Jones, April Rolen-Ogden, and Liskow attorney Michael Golemi discuss the critical steps and considerations involved in responding to catastrophic incidents. They cover initial actions, the importance of communication with government agencies, insurance notification, and the complexities of maintaining privileges and working with the root cause analysis process. The discussion emphasizes the need for careful evidence preservation and the role of experts in managing these situations effectively. The conversation concludes with practical pro tips for handling catastrophic responses.

Listen to the full episode on the Oil & Gas Global Network here.

The 2025 Louisiana Legislative Session has continued to stay busy on the carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) front, with a mix of outcomes for proposed bills. Two CCS-related tax bills, along with four local option bills, failed to advance past committee last week.

However, several CCS bills have made it to the House floor, on key issues such as:

• Eliminating expropriation authority for CO₂ pipelines
• Requiring additional notice to property owners
• Requiring compensation for stranded mineral rights

Amendments on all of these bills are being discussed as they come up on the House floor and as they possibly advance through the legislative process. Stay updated on these bills as they continue to be heard on the 2025 Liskow CCS Legislative Update by Liskow attorney and Louisiana lobbyist Neil Abramson and Liskow CCS attorney Jeff Lieberman.

The Texas Supreme Court, in Myers-Woodward, LLC v. Undergrounds Services Markham, LLC, — S.W.3d —, No. 22-0878, 2025 WL 1415892 (Tex. May 16, 2025), held that surface owners own subsurface salt caverns, even when such caverns are created by mineral owners. In doing so, the Court expressly overruled contrary authority from Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 808 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, writ granted), rev’d on other grounds, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991).

In Myers-Woodward, the mineral owners, Underground Services Markham, LLC and United Brine Pipeline Company, LLC (collectively, “USM”), purportedly owned the salt and salt formations under certain property pursuant to an assignment from a prior mineral owner, and Myers-Woodward, LLC (“Myers”), owned the surface estate. The prior mineral owner received its interests from a mineral deed granting it “all of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on and under said land” but not specifically granting it any interest in any salt formations. The property contained an underground salt dome, and USM mined salt from the salt dome. Those mining operations created a void space in the salt dome, which resembled a cavern with walls composed entirely of salt. That subsurface cavern was suitable for storage of liquids and gases. A dispute arose between USM and Myers over who owned the right to store oil, gas, and other gases or liquids in the subsurface cavern. According to Myers, USM sought to rent the subsurface cavern to third parties to store hydrocarbons, even after USM ceased producing salt from the property, without compensating Myers.

USM filed a lawsuit requesting a declaratory judgment that it, as the creator of the subsurface cavern, owned the right to use it for storage. Myers filed a counterclaim alleging that it owned the subsurface cavern and that USM owned only the salt itself. Competing motions for summary judgment were filed, and the trial court ruled that USM owned the subsurface cavern. The court of appeals disagreed with the with district court and held that Myers retained ownership of the non-mineral elements of the subsurface, including empty space, and that USM had no right to use the subsurface cavern for purposes not specified in the mineral deed. In doing so, the court of appeals expressly declined to follow Mapco, which held that “the continued ownership interest [of] the mineral estate in an underground storage facility is acknowledged and harmonious with the decisional law of our state.”

On appeal to Texas Supreme Court, USM, relying on Mapco, argued that a mineral owner’s ownership of salt included the ownership of salt caverns created by mining operations, and it distinguished seemingly contrary Texas authority on the ground that they were limited to migratory minerals, like oil and gas, and not solid minerals, like salt. Myers, on the other hand, relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s holdings in Regency Field Services, LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. 2021), Lightning Oil Company v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017), and Humble Oil & Refining Company v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1971), that the surface owner owns “the matrix of the underlying earth, i.e., the reservoir storage space.” Myers further criticized Mapco because the authority it relied upon included a Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion that was overruled by the Kentucky Supreme Court four years prior to Mapco, a 1957 law review article stating that the proposition was still unsettled as of 1957, and a Texas Supreme Court case and a 1932 law review article, each of which stated only that mineral owners own the minerals in place.

The Court agreed with Myers. Although the Court acknowledged that its precedent concerning ownership of subsurface space was conceived in the context of oil and gas development, it emphasized two simple considerations that guided its conclusion that Myers owned the subsurface cavern: (1) USM owned only the salt and not the salt formations, and empty space is not salt, regardless of how it is created; and (2) Texas law is clear that surface owners own underground storage space. USM owned only the salt and not the salt formation because its predecessor in title was not conveyed any rights to the salt formations, and because grantors may not convey to a grantee a greater or better title than they hold, USM’s predecessor-in-title could not convey to it any title to salt formations. The Court also opted to adhere to established Texas law because holding otherwise would create one rule for underground storage space encased in salt or other mineral formations and another rule for underground storage space encased in non-mineral rock formations, and such a distinction would create greater complexity and uncertainty in the law. Further, the Court, like the court of appeals, criticized Mapco for being “difficult to parse,” citing “little Texas authority for its key holding,” being not often cited, and being considered a minority view among commentators. Consequently, the Court did not find its reasoning persuasive and expressly overruled it.

The Court also addressed the extent of USM’s right to use and access the subsurface cavern, and held that it could only do so for the production of salt. Mineral owners generally may only use the surface estate to the extent reasonably necessary to produce and remove minerals, which the Court agreed extended to subsurface caverns. However, the Court noted that USM sought to use the subsurface cavern for storage of hydrocarbons produced off the premises, which was more likely to hinder, rather than facilitate, salt production. As such, USM’s intended use of the subsurface cavern was an impermissible use of the surface estate. And because USM’s arguments in favor of storing hydrocarbons in the subsurface cavern flowed from its argument that it owned the subsurface cavern, the Court held that USM established no right to use of the subsurface cavern.

This decision resolves lingering uncertainty in Texas over the ownership of underground storage space, including pore space, that was largely created by the decision in Mapco. See, e.g., Tiffany P. Means & Ryan J. Kemrite, Energy Contracts for the Next 100 Years, 19 Tex. J. Oil, Gas, & Energy L. 146, 186 n. 242 (2024) (“It is worth noting that the question of pore space ownership is complicated by [Mapco]. . . . Thus, the question of pore space ownership in Texas is not completely settled.”); Ali Abazari & Travis W. Wussow, Carbon Capture and Storage, 74 Tex. B.J. 398, 400 (2011) (relying on Mapco and stating, “Under Texas law, the question of whether pore space is owned by the surface estate or the mineral estate is relatively unsettled . . . .”); Russell W. Murdock, The State of CO₂ Sequestration in the State of Texas, 41 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 65, 74 (2010) (relying on Mapco and stating, “Texas law remains unsettled with regard to whether the owner of the surface estate or the owner of the mineral estate owns the subsurface pore space.”).

The resolution of this lingering uncertainty comes at a particularly pertinent time in Texas, considering its recent increased interest in carbon sequestration and storage operations. After all, the desire to store CO­₂ in pore space necessarily gives rise to the question of who owns the pore space, and the Court’s decision provides assurance that “the surface owner, and not the mineral lessee, owns the possessory right to the space under the property’s surface.” Thus, CCS operators can now continue forward with their operations with the added assurance provided by the Court’s decision on the state of Texas law regarding the property rights necessary to sequester and store CO₂.

For further questions regarding this update, contact Liskow attorneys Sam Allen, J.T. Kittrell, Jana Grauberger, and Margaret Chavez and visit our Energy Litigation practice page.