Although pet food and jurisdictional quandaries might seem equally unpalatable, the United States Supreme Court recently tackled a case that touched on both topics. Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. ___, 2025 WL 96212, at *6 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2025). It all started with pet food marketing. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc., was a company that manufactured dog food with an unusual catch: The product was exclusive to pets with a veterinarian’s prescription. Presumably wanting the best for her dog, Ms. Anastasia Wullschleger received the requisite prescription and purchased the dog food for a premium price. But Wullschleger later discovered that Royal Canin’s product was indistinguishable from cheaper over-the-counter options. Following her revelation, Wullschleger filed a lawsuit in state court, citing Royal Canin’s dubious marketing practices. She alleged that the company was fooling pet owners into paying an inflated cost for “premium” dog food that was anything but. Along with state-based causes of action, Wullschleger’s complaint alleged federal claims, all arising under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Citing Wullschleger’s latter allegations, Royal Canin successfully removed the suit to a federal forum. At the time of removal, the district court had original jurisdiction over Wullschleger’s federal claims, while retaining supplemental jurisdiction over her state-based ones. Dissatisfied with the removal, however, Wullschleger attempted a return to state court by filing an amended complaint that deleted every mention of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Because the amended complaint left state-law claims standing “on their own,” Wullschleger argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the lawsuit and moved for a remand, which the district court denied. But on appeal, Wullschleger’s arguments found a more receptive audience before the Eighth Circuit: A three-judge panel concluded that Wullschleger’s amended complaint, which only retained state causes of action, eliminated any basis for federal question jurisdiction. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit departed from the reasoning many of its sister circuits deployed. These other courts differ in holding that a “post-removal amendment [could not] divest a federal court of jurisdiction,” because subject matter jurisdiction was determined by examining the complaint at the time of filing.
Royal Canin believed the Eighth Circuit’s ruling was in error for not falling in line with that reasoning, so it sought review with the United States Supreme Court. In resolving the circuit split, the Court framed the issue as follows: Does an amended complaint that disposes of federal claims destroy jurisdiction in removed cases? Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Kagan answered that question in the affirmative, holding that the district court lacked power to resolve Wullschleger’s lawsuit after the amended complaint erased all federal-based claims. To reach its conclusion, the court considered how amended complaints alter jurisdiction in non-removal cases—i.e., cases where the plaintiff originally files the action in federal court. In those instances, the court explained that an amended complaint, rather than the original one, “determine[s] jurisdiction.” The same rule, the Court thought, should apply with equal force in removal actions. Finding further support in federal statutes, civil procedure rules, and case law, the nine justices all agreed on a basic jurisdictional principle: “The appropriateness of federal jurisdiction—or lack thereof—does not depend on whether the plaintiff first filed suit in federal or state court”; it depends “on the substance of the suit—the legal basis of the claims (federal or state) and the citizenship of the parties (diverse or not?).” And, in all events, an amended complaint devoid of federal claims divests courts of federal question jurisdiction. As a result, Royal Canin and Wohlschlaeger must resolve their beef—or more accurately, the improper marketing of it—in a state forum.
For further questions regarding this ruling, please contact Liskow attorneys Kelly Becker, Ellen D. George, and Chace Vienne and visit our Appellate practice page.
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